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Introduction 
The episode put the question starkly: Who fills the gaps in international 
law and how? A series of tribunals operating under Chapter 11 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)1 had adopted broader 
interpretations of vague treaty language than those recommended by the 
                                                                                                                           
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. Thank you to 
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 1. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2001, Dec. 17, 1992, 
32 I.L.M 289 & 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
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state parties.2 In response, government ministers from the three state parties, 
Mexico, Canada, and the United States, operating through the Free Trade 
Commission (FTC) established by the treaty, adopted “Notes of 
Interpretation” clarifying their view of the treaty’s meaning.3 
International tribunals are generally tasked with examining state 
practice, either to recognize rules of customary international law that state 
practice may evidence4 or to discover from subsequent practice the intended 
meaning of treaty provisions. But when a tribunal’s own interpretations 
conflict with state practice, who wins? Is state practice contrary to a 
tribunal’s decision a breach of international law or a rebuke of the tribunal’s 
view? In the case of NAFTA, the general instruction of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties to look to “subsequent agreement”5 and 
“subsequent practice”6 in interpreting treaty provisions was paired with a 
specific recognition of the FTC’s authority to “resolve disputes that may 
arise regarding [the] interpretation or application” of NAFTA.7 Nonetheless, 
NAFTA tribunals were split on exactly how to regard the “Notes of 
Interpretation” and how much respect they should be due.8 While for some, 
the Notes provided clear evidence of the parties’ intent,9 for others, they 
were an improper attempt to subvert due process and the rule of law.10 
                                                                                                                           
 2. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶¶ 110–113, 
118 (Apr. 10, 2001), 7 ICSID Rep. 102 (2005); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AB)/97/1, Award, ¶¶ 71, 76, 88 (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 
(2002); Charles H. Brower, II, International Decision, S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, and 
Attorney General of Canada v. S.D. Myers, Inc., 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 339, 339–44 (2004) 
[hereinafter Brower, S.D. Myers]; see also Charles H. Brower, II, Why the FTC Notes of 
Interpretation Constitute a Partial Amendment of NAFTA Article 1105, 46 Va. J. Int’l L. 347, 
352–53 (2006) [hereinafter Brower, Why the FTC Notes of Interpretation Constitute a Partial 
Amendment of NAFTA Article 1105] (discussing cases and the Free Trade Commission’s 
responses). For a terrific discussion of the broader questions about international adjudication 
raised by the Pope & Talbot case, see generally Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in 
Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 Am. J. Int’l L. 179 (2010). 
 3. NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
Provisions (July 31, 2001), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/nafta-interpr.aspx?lang=en&view=d. 
 4. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (directing the International Court of Justice 
[ICJ] to consider “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”). 
 5. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
 6. Id. art. 31(3)(b). 
 7. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001(2)(c). 
 8. Roberts, supra note 2, at 180–81. 
 9. See id. at 180–81 (“ ‘[W]e have the Parties themselves—all the Parties—speaking 
to the Tribunal’ and ‘[n]o more authentic and authoritative source of instruction on what the 
Parties intended to convey in a particular provision of NAFTA, is possible.’ ” (quoting ADF 
Grp. Inc. v. United States, ICSID No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, ¶ 177 (Jan. 9, 2003), 18 ICSID 
Rev. 195 (2003))). 
 10. This was the case even if they might begrudgingly have to accept it under the terms 
of the treaty. See id. at 180 n.7 (“The tribunal asked how such a process could be squared with 
the ‘rule of international law that no-one shall be judge in his own cause’ and the purpose of 
the arbitral mechanism to ‘assure due process before an impartial tribunal.’ ” (quoting Pope & 
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This conflict between the NAFTA tribunals and NAFTA state parties 
well illustrates international law’s current identity crisis. One of the most 
noted developments in international law over the past twenty years has been 
the rapid proliferation of courts, tribunals, and other adjudicatory bodies.11 
This development, resulting in an increasing judicialization of international 
law, has widely been touted as a success, as a progressive advance for the 
international legal order.12 Judicialization would advance the development of 
international law, increase the clarity of international rules, bring fairer reso-
lution of disputes, and, perhaps, engender greater compliance.13 But as 
international law continues its rapidly expanding trend toward judicializa-
tion, difficulties with this rosy picture have begun to emerge. Along with 
questions about whether more adjudication actually produces better results 
and whether the ever-expanding catalog of courts instigates the fragmenta-
tion of international law, questions about the relationship between state 
practice and judicial decisions, long recognized as a theoretical difficulty, 
are emerging as serious practical problems. Across a wide range of issues, 
from investment treaties to human rights law to the laws of armed conflict, 
the question of who fills international law’s gaps is becoming stark. 
This question—how international law’s gaps are to be filled—is founda-
tional. It is not just a struggle for control between states, judges, experts, 
NGOs, and advocates—though it inarguably is that as well. It is not just a 
                                                                                                                           
Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages, ¶ 13 (May 31, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 1347 
(2002))). 
 11. See, e.g., Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: 
The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 709, 709 (1999) (“When future 
international legal scholars look back at international law and organizations at the end of the 
twentieth century, they probably will refer to the enormous expansion and transformation of 
the international judiciary as the single most important development of the post-Cold War 
age.”). Conferences and symposia on the subject abound. See, e.g., Symposium, International 
Judges, 9 Chi. J. Int’l L. 387 (2009); Symposium, The International Judicial Function, 34 
Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2011); Symposium, Judicialization and Globalization of 
the Judiciary, 38 Tex. Int’l L.J. 397 (2003); Symposium, The Normalizing of Adjudication in 
Complex International Governance Regimes: Patterns, Possibilities, and Problems, 41 N.Y.U. 
J. Int’l L. & Pol. 755 (2009); Symposium, The Proliferation of International Tribunals: 
Piecing Together the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 679 (1999). 
 12. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Conse-
quences, 38 Tex. Int’l L.J. 405, 407 (2003) (“The [International Criminal Court] is seen 
virtually everywhere, except within John Ashcroft’s Department of Justice, as the triumph of 
international civil society in favor of the judicialization of that last fortress of sovereignty, 
criminal law.”); see also id. at 408 (“The spread of new dispute settlers . . . signifies, to many 
international lawyers, the victory of the rule of law over diplomatic wrangling and the triumph 
of the lawyers over the politicians.”); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International 
Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 Duke L.J. 829, 833 
(1995) (“Within the legal academy, the new [World Trade Organization (WTO)] system repre-
sents a stunning victory for international trade ‘legalists’ in their running debate with trade 
‘pragmatists’ over how international trade dispute resolution should be structured.”); Henry J. 
Steiner, Three Cheers for Universal Jurisdiction—Or Is It Only Two?, 5 Theoretical In-
quiries L. 199, 212 (2004) (“Prosecutions [and the creation of international tribunals] may 
represent for many a higher ideal, a detached and fair process for reaching judgment, a reac-
tion to violence and abomination through observance of the Rule of Law, a triumph of law 
over politics and of civilization over mass insanity.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 12, at 407–09 (summarizing these promises). 
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debate about the level of authority delegated to international courts.14 Un-
derlying the contest for control and authority, this Article argues, is actually 
a confused debate about the nature of international law and its sources. Gap 
filling by states and gap filling by courts represent radically different vi-
sions, radically different models of law and lawmaking. The law created by 
evolving state practice—what I will term here negotiated law—and the law 
pronounced by courts and tribunals—what I will term adjudicated law—
look different, act differently, and rely on different sources of authority and 
legitimacy. They build on different principles and are to some extent in con-
flict with one another. 
These differences between negotiated law and adjudicated law mean 
that the two models are not completely interchangeable or interoperable. 
Traditional international law doctrine imagined a distinctive form of law-
making. Courts, although present, were rare.15 Instead, gaps and disputes in 
international law were left to state-to-state jawboning. States would argue 
over the rules and jockey for position; resolution would come through con-
flict and negotiation.16 This understanding of the lawmaking process was 
well captured by the doctrine of sources, which, particularly in its descrip-
tion of customary international law, explained how state practice slowly 
coalesces around particular agreed-upon (or acquiesced-to) rules.17 
The assumption behind this description’s inclusion in the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ),18 and behind the judicial turn more 
broadly, is that courts can legitimately find and apply law created through 
those processes. But that assumption is problematic. Courts find law in a 
very different way. In contrast to custom’s constant negotiation and renego-
tiation of rules, adjudication relies on reasoned elaboration to fix a rule’s 
meaning. Courts, in a predicament much like that faced by physicists,19 are 
left with the paradox that finding a customary rule inevitably distorts it.20 
Finding customary rules also raises legitimacy concerns. Courts cannot rely 
solely on the notions of consent and party autonomy that undergird law cre-
ated through negotiation. Instead they require additional bases of legitimacy 
not found in the customary jawboning process, whether implicit or explicit 
                                                                                                                           
 14. See, e.g., Karen J. Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in Their Political 
Context, 14 Eur. J. Int’l Rel. 33, 38–39 (2008); Roberts, supra note 2, at 188. 
 15. See infra Part II.A.1. 
  16. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 17. See ICJ Statute, supra note 4, art. 38(1)(b) (listing as a source of law “international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”). In international law, the doctrine 
of sources summarizes the accepted wisdom regarding the proper sources of legal authority 
and their interpretation. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, id., laying out the rules to be applied by 
that court in resolving disputes, is generally treated as the starting point for that doctrine. For 
further discussion of the doctrine, see infra note 164 and accompanying text.  
 18. See ICJ Statute, supra note 4, art. 38(1)(b). 
 19. See Jan Hilgevoord & Jos Uffink, The Uncertainty Principle, in Stan. Encyclope-
dia Phil. (Edward N. Zalta ed., summer 2012 ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
sum2012/entries/qt-uncertainty/. 
 20. Cf. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1770 (1996) (raising con-
cerns about a different type of mismatch in the Uniform Commercial Code’s suggestion that 
courts look to industry custom and practice to resolve contract disputes). 
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delegations, neutrality, expertise, or reasoned decision making. Again creat-
ing a paradox, however, recourse to these additional markers of legitimacy 
may end up undercutting the party autonomy and consent on which custom 
as a source relies. 
So long as adjudication remained rare in international law, the theoreti-
cal problems with using custom as a rule of adjudication could be papered 
over. But as adjudication has become increasingly normal, the tension be-
tween these two visions of lawmaking has only built, producing tremors and 
fissures across international law. Fueled by alternate visions of the evidence 
courts should look to21 or the proper role of courts,22 disputes rage over the 
nature of customary international law. Courts strain to squeeze rough-and-
ready rules developed for negotiated settlement into the crisp rules of liability 
and attribution that adjudication requires.23 In some areas, like the NAFTA 
context mentioned above, state practice and interpretations of international 
law by international courts appear to be on diverging paths. The confusion is 
only compounded by the recognition that many legal regimes, following the 
judicial turn, may now be designed with adjudication in mind. Which ones? 
Which gaps in international law should be seen as invitations to future nego-
tiation, and which as delegations to courts? While arguments abound, few 
clear principles are available. 
The time has come for a fundamental rethinking of international law 
and its sources. Essentially, international law has reached its Erie24 moment. 
Much as U.S. judges and lawyers were forced by Erie v. Tompkins to re-
spond to the dramatic ways in which domestic law had changed, so too must 
international lawyers and international judges now grapple with the expan-
sion and evolution of international law. Just as Erie v. Tompkins forced U.S. 
federal judges out of the shadows of the common law to recognize and justi-
fy the authority they exert, so too must international courts now look beyond 
traditional doctrinal understandings of international law to grapple with the 
new roles they’ve been given. The myth that all international law emerges 
from the practice of states, much like the myth of an overarching, discover-
able common law, must be burst. It obscures the true processes of 
lawmaking and allows courts to duck justifying their authority and legitima-
cy.25 With reports of a system of precedent emerging from areas as diverse 
                                                                                                                           
 21. See, e.g., Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Cus-
tomary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 757, 758–59 (2001).  
 22. Compare Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International 
Tribunals, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (2005) (describing international courts as tools states can 
use to preserve mutually beneficial arrangements), with Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and 
Yoo, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 901, 942 (2005) (developing a richer account in which delegation to 
international tribunals can make commitments more credible, help resolve commons and pub-
lic-goods problems, protect the rights of private parties, or solve collective-action problems 
presented by multilateral agreements). 
 23. See, e.g., Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International Criminal 
Law, 86 Ind. L.J. 1063, 1073–78 (2011) (suggesting that liability rules adopted by interna-
tional criminal tribunals cannot be traced to customary international law). 
 24. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 25. See Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International Judicial 
Institutions As Lawmakers, 12 German L.J. 979, 984 (2011) (raising similar questions).  
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as international investment law,26 international trade,27 human rights,28 and 
international criminal law,29 the time has come to identify the actual claimed 
sources of international law and test their legitimacy. 
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I develops a model of negoti-
ated law to describe the operation and nature of custom and other nontreaty 
law under traditional international law doctrine. Drawing on a burgeoning 
literature regarding areas of primarily negotiated domestic law, including 
out-of-court settlements, the social norms of specialized business communi-
ties,30 and political-branch separation of powers, this Part begins to draw the 
distinctions between law achieved primarily through negotiated settlement 
and law created through the adjudication of disputes. Along with a variety of 
practical differences that make translation between negotiated and adjudica-
tory contexts difficult, this discussion demonstrates that negotiated law and 
adjudicated law derive their legitimacy from fundamentally different, and 
often incompatible, sources. 
Part II explores where we are and how we got there. Part II.A looks at the 
current operation of custom and other unwritten rules in the international sys-
tem, and describes the transition from relatively rare ad hoc arbitration of 
international disputes to the widespread judicialization of international law of 
today. This Section also looks more closely at the theoretical problems this 
transition has produced, in particular the un-worked-out theoretical complica-
tions with the judicial pronouncement of custom and other unwritten rules. 
Part II.B lays out some examples of areas where judicialized custom seems to 
be running in different directions from negotiated custom, threatening the 
legitimacy, coherence, and effectiveness of international law. In many areas, 
it appears that two parallel international laws have been created: one, gap 
free, in which courts, tribunals, or expert bodies progressively develop the 
                                                                                                                           
 26. See, e.g., Stephan W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International 
Investment Law 8–9, 11 (2009). 
 27. See, e.g., Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law 
(Part One of a Trilogy), 14 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 845, 850 (1999) (“In brief, there is a body 
of international common law of trade emerging as a result of adjudication by the WTO’s 
Appellate Body. We have yet to recognize, much less account for, this reality in our doctri-
nal thinking and discussions.”); Robert Howse, Moving the WTO Forward—One Case at a 
Time, 42 Cornell Int’l L.J. 223, 223–24 (2009) (“The WTO dispute settlement system has 
demonstrated its efficacy by evolving incrementally through practice without a formal change 
in the treaty mandate that established and defined the parameters of that system.”); Zhu Lanye, 
The Effects of the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body Reports: Is the Dispute 
Settlement Body Resolving Specific Disputes Only or Making Precedent at the Same Time?, 17 
Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 221, 230 (2003) (“If we regard precedents as decisions furnishing a 
basis for determining later cases involving similar facts or issues we can say without hesitation 
that large amounts of such precedents exist in the WTO dispute settlement system.”). 
 28. See, e.g., Christina Binder, The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, 12 German L.J. 1203, 1204 (2011) (evaluating the Inter-American 
Court’s dynamic interpretation of rights that, “at times, hardly finds a legal basis in the [gov-
erning] Convention”).  
 29. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 1073–78 (tracing liability rules adopted by 
international criminal tribunals to noncustomary sources). 
 30. Examples include Robert Ellickson’s Shasta County ranchers, Lisa Bernstein’s 
diamond and cotton traders, and the Japanese Tuna Court. See infra notes 45–47 and accom-
panying text.  
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meaning of international law’s unwritten rules, and one, gap filled, in which 
a great deal of international law remains to be worked out in consultations 
among states. In some cases, the jurisprudence of international bodies, alt-
hough widely cited by scholars and advocates, has been ignored by states, 
raised questions about the bodies’ legitimacy,31 or even led to backlashes 
against international law.32 This Section focuses on three examples in par-
ticular: (1) the conflict between tribunals and state parties to control the 
meaning of investment treaties; (2) the conflicts between the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and states over the use of diplomatic assur-
ances in the transfer of detainees; and (3) the applicability of self-defense to 
conflicts with nonstate actors. 
Part III considers the way forward. What is most apparent is that we are 
in a state of confusion. A first, key step is gaining greater precision in our 
understanding of international sources. Rather than speak only of “custom,” 
using the concept as an all-purpose label for nontreaty rules, we need to 
think carefully about the different types of unwritten rules currently being 
applied or asserted in the system. Are we talking about custom, common 
law, rules of equity, discursive principles, or something else entirely? Only 
after these types of rules have been properly identified can we really talk 
about their authority and legitimacy. The second, harder question is how and 
when different courts should apply these rules. What role are various bodies 
meant to play within and with regard to particular regimes? Are they arbitral 
tribunals, common law courts, or something else? Should we encourage the 
progressive development of the law, revive the presumption against prece-
dent, or develop special rules of decision for the resolution of disputes?33 
This Part considers a number of ways we might answer these questions. 
I. Negotiated Law 
A. International Law and Gaps 
It has become almost axiomatic in discussions of domestic law that gaps 
or ambiguities in the law are delegations of lawmaking to courts. As Ehrlich 
                                                                                                                           
 31. See, e.g., HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel 58(2) PD 393 [2005] 
(Isr.) (Cheshin, M., concurring), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/570/079/ 
A14/04079570.a14.htm (deriding the reasoning of the ICJ’s advisory opinion and proclaiming 
that he “could not discover those distinguishing marks which turn a document into a legal 
opinion or a judgment of a court”).  
 32. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Rela-
tions Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 
102 Colum. L. Rev. 1832, 1836 (2002) (questioning whether the legalization of human rights 
norms increases state compliance). 
 33. Rather than tracking the theoretical description of international law’s sources, we 
might instead want a rule tailored to a specific type of suit. This might arguably be what the 
U.S. Supreme Court was groping toward in developing its “specific, universal, and obligatory” 
standard for law-of-nations torts recognized under the Alien Tort Statute. See Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 749 (2004); cf. Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal 
Common Law: A New Approach, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1931, 1941–43 (2010) (suggesting 
that the standard is not the international law standard for custom, but a unique standard devel-
oped for administering these types of cases). 
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and Posner observed, the choice between precision and ambiguity, between 
rules and standards, is a choice between legislative decision making and 
judicial decision making.34 Legislators enact and parties contract in the 
shadow of the court system; they know that gaps left in legislation or con-
tracts will eventually be interpreted by courts. 
The same, however, cannot be said of international law. Until relatively 
recently in world history, judicial resolution of international disputes was a 
rarity. There was no permanent international court until the birth of the Per-
manent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1922,35 and the dockets of 
both the PCIJ and its successor, the ICJ, have remained relatively small, 
representing a tiny fraction of international disputes.36 Ad hoc arbitral tribu-
nals have been used since ancient times but were also rare until the late 
nineteenth century.37 
The absence of adjudication in international law certainly does not re-
flect an absence of gaps or ambiguities. If anything, international law is 
notorious for both.38 How then have these been filled or worked out? Rather 
than delegate gaps to adjudication, international law traditionally has dele-
gated gaps to further negotiation. Where the content of rules has been in 
dispute or the actions of one state questioned, international law has left it to 
diplomacy, negotiation, political contestation, pressure, and sometimes war 
to work out the answers. Disputes, to the extent they are resolved, are settled 
rather than adjudged. 
This process fits well with traditional descriptions of custom, which at 
least until the twentieth century made up the bulk of international law.39 De-
                                                                                                                           
 34. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 
J. Legal Stud. 257, 258, 261 (1974). 
 35. The Court: History, Int’l Ct. Just., http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php? 
p1=1&p2=1 (last visited Feb. 10, 2013) [hereinafter ICJ History]. 
 36. See Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 Duke L.J. 775, 
805 & n.105 (2012) (estimating that the ICJ heard fewer than two cases a year before the end 
of the Cold War and still hears no more than an average of three per year). For a comparison 
with some newer tribunals, see Karen J. Alter, Transplanting the European Court of Justice: 
The Experience of the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 629, 631 n.11 (2012). 
 37. See James Parker Hall, The Force of Precedents in International Law, 26 Int’l J. 
Ethics 149, 151 (1916) (“Nations cannot be forced into courts against their wills, and arbitra-
tions dealing with general questions of international law have been comparatively rare, so that 
upon many subjects the voluntary usages of nations constitute the principal or most persuasive 
sources of authority.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Jack J. Coe, Jr., The State Of Investor-State Arbitration—Some Reflections 
on Professor Brower’s Plea for Sensible Principles, 20 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 929, 947 (2005) 
(“International law specialists, accustomed to the decentralized sources upon which the sys-
tem depends, tolerate a measure of indeterminacy.”). 
 39. David Bederman, for example, talks about models of customary international law as 
processes of “struggle and resistance” or of a “ ‘marketplace’ in which states affirmatively 
(and self-consciously) ‘bid’ and ‘barter’ and ‘trade’ in new rules of conduct.” David J. 
Bederman, The Spirit of International Law 57 (2002) [hereinafter Bederman, The 
Spirit of International Law]. Despite their different valences, both descriptions capture 
the idea that custom emerges from active contestation over rules. See David J. Bederman, 
Custom As a Source of Law 164–65, 180 (2010) [hereinafter Bederman, Custom As a 
Source of Law] (describing customary international law as a system of “bids” and “blocks”); 
Frederick Schauer, Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary Law, in The Nature of Cus-
tomary Law: Legal, Historical, and Philosophical Perspectives 13, 32 (Amanda 
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fining and describing customary international law with precision is a “noto-
riously difficult” task; disagreements abound,40 but through iterative practice 
between states, laws begin to take shape. The content of the law is clarified, 
not by adjudication, but by practice. 
But this view of international law’s exposition is applicable beyond tra-
ditional notions of custom. Gaps and ambiguities in treaties too are often 
resolved through negotiation and settlement rather than adjudication. The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declares both subsequent agree-
ments and subsequent practice relevant to interpreting treaty provisions, a 
reflection of international law’s preference for negotiated interpretations and 
gap fillers over ones produced by reasoned judging.41 
As explained in the next Section, the key here is that the difference be-
tween adjudicatory gap filling and negotiated gap filling is not merely one of 
process. Law made through these different mechanisms looks different and 
acts differently. Negotiated law and adjudicated law are actually two differ-
ent types of law entirely.42 
B. Negotiated Laws: Settlements, Private Legal Systems,  
and Separation of Powers 
One way to begin to look at the differences between adjudicated and 
negotiated law is to look at instances of negotiated law in domestic systems. 
Over the past thirty years, scholars working in a variety of areas have begun 
to study alternatives to the traditional picture of courts as ultimate arbiters of 
the law. For example, since the publication of Owen Fiss’s seminal article 
Against Settlement,43 academic debate has raged over the increased 
frequency of out-of-court settlements and the concurrent decrease in 
                                                                                                                           
Perreau-Saussine & James B. Murphy eds., 2007) (comparing the imagined operation of cus-
tom to “the marketplace of ideas”). 
 40. See, e.g., Bederman, The Spirit of International Law, supra note 39, at 39 
(“[T]he methods for finding the evidences of state practice are very supple and require sub-
stantial imagination and skill . . . .”); Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of 
International Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems, 15 Eur. J. Int’l 
L. 523, 551 (2004) (“Customary international law just happens to be a topic where uncertain-
ties abound.”); Suzannah Linton & Firew Kebede Tiba, The International Judge in an Age of 
Multiple International Courts and Tribunals, 9 Chi. J. Int’l L. 407, 416 (2009); see also J. 
Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 449, 469 
(2000) (criticizing custom on those grounds). 
 41. Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires taking 
account of “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions.” VCLT, supra note 5, art. 31(3)(a) (emphasis added). 
Article 31(3)(b) requires taking account of “any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.” VCLT, supra 
note 5, art. 31(3)(b) (emphasis added).  
 42. There is, of course, another means of filling the gaps in the law that I explicitly put 
to one side here: legislation. Legislation actually bears similarities to each of these models. It 
is negotiated and bears many of negotiated law’s hallmarks as compromise solutions. It is, on 
the other hand, much more like adjudicated law in having the explicit goal of producing rules 
applicable to future cases. What differentiates it, and requires putting it to the side here, is that 
legislated law, whether in the form of statutes or treaties, usually follows an explicitly agreed-
upon process and involves explicit delegation of lawmaking powers.  
 43. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984). 
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adjudication. Advocates on both sides of the debate highlight both the 
practical and normative differences between law made each way.44 Writing 
about very different phenomena, scholars including Robert Ellickson and 
Lisa Bernstein have begun to study specific communities—Shasta County 
ranchers,45 diamond merchants,46 cotton traders47—in which a shadow 
community-based law has developed, one that largely avoids formal or 
official state courts. Another type of negotiation takes place between the 
legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government in the separation-
of-powers context. Many areas of constitutional law, particularly war 
powers, have remained insulated from judicial review by doctrines of 
abstention (like the political-question doctrine) or deference.48 Much of the 
doctrine about the branches’ respective powers has emerged instead from 
regular interbranch quarrelling and the resulting interbranch customary 
practice.49 Debates rage over how historical practice should matter,50 not 
over whether it does.51 
A few notes before going any further. First, for some, the term “negoti-
ated” may conjure visions of civil discussions resulting in mutual, 
consensual, bargained-for benefits. That is not the intent here. The use of the 
term “negotiated” here is broader and meant only to indicate that resolution 
is met through the conduct of the parties. Their tactics may include negotia-
tion, threats, even war; differences in power may be rife; and the results may 
look to some entirely unfair or even coerced. Second, negotiated law and 
adjudicated law are “ideal types.” No set of laws, including those considered 
here,52 fits one paradigm perfectly. Courts are often involved in negotiation: 
                                                                                                                           
 44. See infra Part I.B.1–4. 
 45. Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 1 
(1994). 
 46. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations 
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992). 
 47. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Coopera-
tion Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001); see also A.W. 
Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 
Cardozo L. Rev. 287, 321–22 (1989) (presenting an overview of the cotton industry’s private 
legal system). 
 48. See, e.g., Harold H. Koh, The National Security Constitution 146–47 
(1990) (describing judicial trends in use of nonjusticiability doctrines).  
 49. See id. at 70 (describing “quasi-constitutional custom,” or “institutional norms gen-
erated by the historical interaction of two or more federal branches with one another,” that is 
“not dissimilar to rules of customary law observed by nations in the international arena”). A 
particularly good illustration of this phenomenon is provided by Peter Spiro, who documents 
how our current understanding of the constitutionality of congressional-executive agreements 
is a product of a continuing back-and-forth between the legislative and executive branches. 
Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 
961, 965–72 (2001).  
 50. E.g., Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers 
Disputes, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 110 (1984). 
 51. These areas of negotiated law are meant to be illustrative rather than exclusive. 
There are undoubtedly many other areas of law that might provide useful insights. 
 52. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical 
and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 Geo. L.J. 2663, 2671 (1995) 
(“[B]oth categories of ‘settlement’ and ‘adjudication’ contain enough variation within them to 
Cohen FTP 1_C.doc 3/7/20132:35 PM 
Winter 2013] International Law’s Erie Moment 259 
sometimes with the litigants (they may actually encourage settlement on 
issues), sometimes with other courts, sometimes even internally in the case 
of multimember panels. Similarly, in contexts where interactions are fre-
quent and information about norms and violations are readily available,53 
informal dispute resolution may look more adjudicatory. (In such contexts, 
the overall community may be able to judge certain acts lawful or unlawful.) 
Negotiated law and adjudicated law are instead attempts to generalize 
broadly about the making of law in these contexts. As Max Weber ex-
plained, an “ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or 
more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, 
more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenome-
na, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized 
viewpoints into a unified analytical construct . . . .”54 Constructing ideal 
types like negotiated law and adjudicated law helps us to contrast and un-
derstand broad types of phenomena without getting lost in the innumerable 
differences between individual cases. 
Third, while this Section seeks to find commonality among these areas 
of law made outside of courts, it is important to keep in mind that each of 
these areas of law is unique, representing a particular set of choices about 
how law will be made, interpreted, and enforced. The particular mix of ne-
gotiation and adjudication, procedural formality and informality, and 
centralized versus decentralized decision making will differ between each.55 
It is also important to note that in the domestic context, courts and adjudica-
tion often lurk in the shadows and may still exert some unseen force on the 
law’s development even when they are rarely (or never) used.56 
With those caveats in mind, seen together, various patterns in the opera-
tion of law in these areas do seem to emerge. Scholarship in these areas 
begins to draw an alternative picture of the law, one with some stark differ-
ences from the law made by courts. 
1. Clarity of Rules 
One of the key ways in which settlements, consent decrees, community 
custom, and political-branch practice often differ from adjudication is in the 
clarity of the legal rules they produce. This is a regular trope in the debate 
between advocates and opponents of out-of-court settlements. Critics of 
                                                                                                                           
make them almost meaningless concepts to compare in the abstract. The conduct of negotiated 
settlements and various stages along the adjudication spectrum include such variations of 
lawyer experience, skill and resources, party motivations and resources, and legal system 
endowments (both procedural and substantive) that we must, for the purposes of argument, 
consider these categories as little more than ‘ideal types.’ ”). 
 53. See Ellickson, supra note 45, at 230–39 (observing that for informal systems to 
function properly, information about acts and norms must flow freely within the community). 
 54. Max Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science, in Classical Sociological Theory 
211, 211 (Craig Calhoun et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007) (emphasis omitted). 
 55. The dispute resolution mechanisms of the National Grain and Feed Association in 
the United States, for example, while extrajudicial, are highly formal. See Bernstein, supra 
note 20, at 1775. 
 56. See, e.g., Robert N. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 950 (1979) (suggesting this basic insight). 
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settlement contrast adjudication, “the process by which the values embodied 
in an authoritative legal text, such as the Constitution, are given concrete 
meaning and expression,”57 with settlements that produce no rule or prece-
dent binding on nonparties.58  
By judging and enunciating rules, judges set baselines for political 
endowments and entitlements and alternately close and open de-
bates by reviewing facts and articulating the rules and values that 
underlie particular legal positions. Settlements, on the other hand, 
represent cruder “compromises” of raw bargaining skill and extra-
judicial power imbalances (economics, legal skill, and repeat play 
experience).59  
“Rules and precedents . . . have obvious importance for guiding future be-
havior and imposing order and certainty on a transactional world that would 
otherwise be in flux and chaos,”60 and William Landes and Richard Posner 
worry that such rules and precedents will be underproduced by private dis-
pute resolution.61 Settlements may succeed in achieving peace, but “courts,” 
argues Fiss, “exist to give meaning to our public values, not to resolve dis-
putes.”62 
Proponents of settlement disagree about the values at stake, about the 
relative desirability of adjudication, and about whether settlement in fact 
produces “no” rules or precedents, but accept the basic contrast. Rules and 
precedent do emerge from settlements, proponents argue, but in a much 
more limited fashion.63 As Ben Depoorter argues, 
First, prior settlements exert “peer pressure” on similarly situated 
parties, effectively weakening their position in comparable disputes. 
Innovative settlements serve as benchmarks to ambitious lawyers, 
making plaintiffs in future disputes more demanding and thus more 
                                                                                                                           
 57. Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 Law & 
Hum. Behav. 121, 121 (1982). 
 58. Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, Soc. Phil. & Pol’y, Sept. 
1986, at 102, 114–19. David Luban argues that the clarity of the rules produced by settlement 
is further diminished by the underproduction of facts (which might clarify rules and prece-
dents). David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 Geo. L.J. 2619, 
2625 (1995). 
 59. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 52, at 2667 (describing David Luban’s position). 
 60. Luban, supra note 58, at 2622–23. 
 61. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication As a Private Good, 8 J. 
Legal Stud. 235, 238–40 (1979). 
 62. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1979). 
 63. See, e.g., Laura J. Cooper et al., ADR in the Workplace 232–33 (2000) (“For 
good or ill, however, parties and arbitrators alike frequently refer to previous decisions. Parties 
usually do so in the hope that previous awards will persuade the arbitrator of the merits of 
their positions, not because they regard the awards as binding. Arbitrators usually do so to 
justify their decisions.”); Benjamin C. Fishman, Note, Binding Corporations to Human Rights 
Norms Through Public Law Settlement, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1433, 1462 (2006) (“There are at 
least three ways in which [public law] settlements . . . could exert generalized normative pres-
sure: (1) ‘spillover’ effects, where a settlement puts pressure on other corporations to change 
their behavior; (2) transnational advocacy based on reported violations of the settlement-
created code; and (3) further litigation arising from breach of the settlement terms.”).  
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reluctant to accept settlements below those that parties in prior set-
tlements received. 
Second, due to their noncoercive nature, settlements may frame 
the normative outlook on particular claims or disputes. A novel le-
gal claim for tort compensation might be considered outrageous at 
first, but will be perceived as less extraordinary if it has been grati-
fied by a prior concession in a settlement agreement. As a 
settlement precedent reduces the apparent unreasonableness of any 
claim, it becomes harder for similarly situated parties to contest 
similar claims in future cases.64 
In some areas with repeat players on one or both sides of the dispute, 
settlements and consent decrees may actually become models, setting stand-
ards for future behavior.65 
Public norms do not consist only of the precedents developed and 
applied by courts or other adjudicative bodies. They also emerge 
when relevant institutional actors develop values or remedies through 
an accountable process of principled and participatory decision mak-
ing, and then adapt these values and remedies to broader groups or 
situations. [Alternative dispute resolution] can play a significant role 
in developing legitimate and effective solutions to common problems 
and, in the process, produce generalizable norms.66 
But even if rules are produced through these processes, they remain 
considerably more ambiguous than those typically created through adjudica-
tion. Because technical questions about liability do not need to be 
answered,67 there is a “mushiness”68 to the precedent that settlements create. 
                                                                                                                           
 64. Ben Depoorter, Essay, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of 
Civil Settlements, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 957, 960 (2010). As Depoorter explains,  
[D]espite the widespread use of nondisclosure agreements, information on settle-
ments is available to those legal professionals for whom such information is most 
valuable. Information on innovative settlements is distributed both inside and out-
side legal communities, reaching actors through various channels including the oral 
culture in legal communities, specialized reporters, professional interest organiza-
tions, and mass media coverage.  
Id. at 965–66.  
 65. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 52, at 2680–81 (“For example, repeat play arbitrations 
and mediations are sensitive not only to the ‘norms’ created by numerous repeat cases, but 
increasingly to published reports of settlements.”). This is particularly the case when the gov-
ernment is on one side enforcing legislation. See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency & U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Model CERCLA MSW Generator/Transporter Consent Decree 
(Apr. 4, 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/ 
superfund/msw-mss-cd-mod-mem.pdf. See generally Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by 
Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Re-
form, 1984 Duke L.J. 887. 
 66. Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. 
Disp. Resol. 1, 3. 
 67. Depoorter, supra note 64, at 983 (“[C]onfidential settlements work to the detriment 
of the public by delaying awareness of underlying liability issues.”). 
 68. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 52, at 2678.  
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Settlements can also obscure the “true” facts underlying the dispute, making 
future analogies more difficult and contestable.69 
The analogy to international law is readily apparent. For example, states 
often agree on lump-sum payments to settle their disputes. While such set-
tlements might provide very general evidence that a wrongful act has taken 
place, they often provide little insight into the exact nature of the violation, 
the identity of the wrongdoer, or the standard of liability (for instance, neg-
ligence or strict liability).70 A very general rule about “prompt, adequate, 
and effective” compensation may emerge from state practice regarding in-
vestment expropriations, but exactly what it requires will be much harder to 
discern.71 And a norm of compensating civilian victims in war zones may 
appear to be emerging,72 but how or when such compensation is actually 
required remains murky. 
But other, less analogous areas of custom suggest similar patterns. The 
ambiguity of customary separation-of-powers law in the United States is 
well documented. For Harold Koh, for example, “both the informal process 
that governs the creation of these customary norms and the difficulties 
inherent in establishing their existence suggest” caution in applying them.73 
This concern is echoed in Justice Frankfurter’s emphasis in the canonical 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer that a longstanding practice of the 
executive branch may be assumed to be constitutional, but only where the 
practice is “systematic, unbroken,” and “long pursued to the knowledge of 
the Congress and never before questioned.”74 And Michael Glennon 
observes that “the use of custom requires the finding of historical facts, 
often through reliance on sources that are every bit as obscure as those used 
to divine the [intent of the framers of the U.S. Constitution]. There is clearly 
nothing approaching certainty in this fact-finding process.”75 Individual 
examples abound in the United States of reasonably durable rules produced 
by interbranch jawboning, whether with regard to the constitutionality of 
                                                                                                                           
 69. See Luban, supra note 58, at 2625 (arguing that the clarity of the rules produced by 
settlement is further diminished by the underproduction of facts, which might clarify rules and 
precedents). 
 70. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 17, 47 
(2009) (“In addition, within the sphere of international investment law, arbitral decisions have 
always been treated as more relevant to determining the rules of CIL than, for example, lump 
sum agreements—which tell us only what the last set of states were willing to settle for and 
not what the law is.”). 
 71. Frank G. Dawson & Burns H. Weston, “Prompt, Adequate and Effective”: A Uni-
versal Standard of Compensation?, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 727, 727 (1962). 
 72. See, e.g., Jonathan Tracy, Responsibility to Pay: Compensating Civilian Casualties 
of War, Hum. Rts. Brief, Fall 2007, at 16, 16–17 (discussing the narrow norm of compensa-
tion that is emerging); Ron Synovitz, Afghanistan: NATO Begins Fund for Civilian War 
Victims, Radio Free Eur./Radio Liberty (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.rferl.org/ 
content/article/1074305.html. 
 73. Koh, supra note 48, at 70. 
 74. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring).  
 75. Glennon, supra note 50, at 126. Further, “[f]acts, as Jerome Frank reminded us, are 
guesses, and the guesswork is particularly troublesome in the law of interbranch relation-
ships.” Id. 
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congressional-executive agreements,76 congressional authorizations of 
military force,77 or recess appointments,78 where the exact contours of the 
rule remain in doubt. Questions remain regarding the interchangeability of 
congressional-executive agreements and Article II Treaties,79 the meaning of 
“hostilities” under the War Powers Resolution,80 or the exact meaning of a 
“recess.”81 
The lesson from each of these examples is that negotiated law often 
produces rules and precedents that are less certain and more ambiguous than 
those produced by courts. As Frederick Schauer explains, in both the com-
mon law and civil law contexts, adjudication “seeks to eliminate internal 
inconsistency when the opportunity arises, and treats mutually exclusive 
norms as at least problematic.”82 This stands in contrast to custom, which is 
much more likely to accept the presence of “plural and diverse”83 rules. 
What is key, though, is that within these areas of negotiated law, the po-
tential ambiguity of rules is seen as a benefit, not a detriment.84 This 
ambiguity leaves much greater room for flexibility,85 experimentation, and 
                                                                                                                           
 76. See Spiro, supra note 49, at 993 (“[A]n ad hoc typology has developed [in the Unit-
ed States] under which some types of international agreements continue to be submitted [to 
the U.S. Senate] as treaties, arguably by constitutional mandate, and others might require the 
form of congressional-executive agreement.”). 
 77. See id. at 1021–22, 1023 n.255 (suggesting a general consensus surrounding the 
balance of congressional and executive authority in the United States). 
 78. See generally Henry B. Hogue, Cong. Research Serv., RS21308, Recess Ap-
pointments: Frequently Asked Questions (2008). 
 79. See Spiro, supra note 49, at 995–1002 (arguing that U.S. interbranch custom sug-
gests that arms control and human rights treaties may or may not be proper subjects of 
congressional-executive agreements). 
 80. E.g., Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role 
in Libya Operation, N.Y. Times, June 16, 2011, at A16. 
 81. E.g., Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Defends Obama Recess Appointments, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 13, 2012, at A12. The D.C. Circuit has recently weighed in on this question in 
Canning v. NLRB, Nos. 12–1115, 12–1153, 2013 WL 276024 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013), 
holding that recess appointments could only be made between formal sessions of Congress. 
Interestingly, the decision itself might demonstrate some of the differences described in this 
Section between negotiated and adjudicated interpretations, as the decision adopted a much 
stricter interpretation of the recess-appointment power than had been accepted in practice 
by Congress and the executive branch. See, e.g., Emily Heil, Obama Not Only President 
with Recess Appointments, Wash. Post: In the Loop (Feb. 5, 2013, 12:48 
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/post/obama-not-only-president-with- 
recess-appointments/2013/02/05/153c6e74-6fb4-11e2-8b8d-e0b59a1b8e2a_blog.html (de-
scribing prior practices). 
 82. Schauer, supra note 39, at 30. 
 83. Id. at 30; see also Bederman, Custom As a Source of Law, supra note 39, at 
180.  
 84. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 52, at 2678 (“We should continue to discuss 
whether rules and principles are fair, whether ‘giving up’ something is necessary or justified, 
whether rules should be sharply delineated or allow more discretion and elasticity to meet the 
needs of particular circumstances, and what principles should govern particular situations.”). 
 85. See Koh, supra note 48, at 72 (“That legal structure both facilitates and constrains 
the operation of the [U.S.] national security policy process.”); Spiro, supra note 49, at 1009 
(“A constitutional increments approach, by contrast, presents a constant dynamic in which the 
[U.S.] Constitution exploits the advantages both of flexibility and constraint.”). 
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renegotiation.86 As Peter Spiro writes of interbranch foreign-affairs custom 
in the United States, “[t]he structure is one that can be changed, and in fact 
each succeeding generation will change it.”87 This is key because negotiated 
law is often chosen in contexts of continuing or ongoing relationships, 
where the finality produced by adjudication is less valuable than the possi-
bility of renegotiation as circumstances change. The clarity produced by 
adjudication may foster predictability, but the ambiguous results of negotia-
tion foster flexibility.88 
2. Winners and Losers Versus Compromise 
Some of these differences in rule clarity result from adjudication’s and 
negotiation’s contrasting approaches to dispute resolution. Adjudication as a 
model (again, we’re talking about ideal types here) seeks an ultimate deci-
sion about the rightfulness or wrongfulness of the parties’ conduct. That is 
what is in dispute. And in reaching a conclusion, one side will win and the 
other side will lose. The result is essentially binary89—the behavior was law-
ful or unlawful, excusable or inexcusable.90 Negotiation need not follow that 
pattern. The parties to a dispute can choose a variety of ways to reach some 
sort of settlement and may find a mutually acceptable resolution that avoids 
either blame or vindication. 
This is, of course, Alternative Dispute Resolution 101. As the nearly ca-
nonical Getting to Yes reminds us, in negotiations, the goal should be to 
“Focus on Interests, Not Positions.”91 And contrasting the narrowness of the 
choices presented to courts with the much broader calculus, the greater 
range of issues that can be brought to the table for negotiated solutions is a 
key theme of the out-of-court-settlement literature.92 Whereas settlement 
skeptics worry that negotiated resolutions favor peace over justice,93 set-
tlement’s proponents worry that “a litigated outcome will produce binary 
                                                                                                                           
 86. See Koh, supra note 48, at 71 (“Although this large body of quasi-constitutional 
custom fills in the interstices of the textual and statutory skeleton of the National Security 
Constitution, it is perennially subject to revision.”). 
 87. Spiro, supra note 49, at 1032. 
 88. Cf. Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise 39 (1st ed. 1905) 
(“Codification certainly interferes with the so-called organic growth of the law through usage 
into custom.”).  
 89. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 52, at 2672 (discussing “adjudication, with 
its binary or win-loss solutions”). 
 90. Of course, adjudication is more complicated than this. Courts may, for example, 
adopt rules that seek to reconcile the arguments of the parties. The result though—that one 
party will win and the other lose on any given issue—is likely to remain the same.  
 91. Roger Fisher & William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement 
Without Giving In ch. 3 (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 1991) (1981).  
 92. See e.g., Coleman & Silver, supra note 58, at 106; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 52, 
at 2672.  
 93. E.g., Fiss, supra note 43, at 1075; Luban, supra note 58, at 2620–21; Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 52, at 2668 (“[Luban] suggests that those who continue to favor secret 
settlements prefer the ‘problem-solving’ (dispute resolution) conception of our legal system to 
‘public production of rules and precedents’ or the ‘public goods and discourse’ function.”). 
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win-lose results that often do not capture the ‘just reality.’ ”94 
“[C]ompromise (or at least nonbinary solutions),” on the other hand, “may 
represent more ‘precise justice,’ ”95 offering “the opportunity to craft solu-
tions that do not compromise, but offer greater expression of the variety of 
remedial possibilities in a postmodern world.”96 “Noncompromise settle-
ments offer the promise that more than money can be at stake and that the 
parties can negotiate such other items as future relationships and conduct, 
apologies, in-kind trade, new contracts, etc.”97 This theme is echoed in the 
community-custom literature, which notes the different logic of negotiated 
and adjudicated dispute resolution. Lisa Bernstein, for example, notes that 
merchants will often distinguish between more flexible “relationship-
preserving norms” that they will use to settle their own disputes and stricter 
“endgame norms” that they will ask external adjudicators to apply.98 
Finding examples of international law disputes resolved this way is also 
easy. Disputes between states initially framed in terms of opposing legal 
positions are often settled through the negotiation of some broader agree-
ment from which both sides can benefit. Resolution of the underlying legal 
issue may drop away completely. Mexico, for instance, chose not to press 
for adoption of a favorable panel report in the Tuna-Dolphin dispute, leaving 
open the legal questions at the heart of its conflict with the United States99 in 
return for favorable access to the U.S. tuna market and smooth passage of 
the much more important NAFTA.100 The 1794 Jay Treaty similarly resolved 
some of the legal issues between the United States and Great Britain, but the 
United States sacrificed agreement on the status of neutral shipping, one of 
its key legal arguments against Great Britain, in return for broader shipping 
access to British West Indies ports.101 In a more recent example, the dispute 
between the United States and Pakistan regarding alleged CIA agent Ray-
mond Davis’s diplomatic status102 was never directly resolved. Instead, Davis 
                                                                                                                           
 94. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 52, at 2674. 
 95. Id. at 2674. 
 96. Id. at 2675. 
 97. Id. at 2674. 
 98. Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation 
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710, 766–71 (1999). 
 99. Specifically, these questions involved the permissibility of Process and Production 
Method regulation and the territorial scope of acceptable animal-health regulations under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See sources cited infra note 100. 
 100. Torsten H. Strom, Another Kick at the Can: Tuna/Dolphin II, 33 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 
149, 155–60 (1995); Kohei Saito, Yardsticks for “Trade and Environment”: Economic Analy-
sis of the WTO Panel and the Appellate Body Reports Regarding Environment-Oriented Trade 
Measures (Jean Monnet Ctr. for Int’l & Reg’l Econ. Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 14/01, 
2001), available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/papers/01/013701-02.html. 
Mexico was apparently concerned that pressing its victory might mobilize U.S. environmental 
groups to try to scuttle NAFTA. Strom, supra, at 161 n.52; accord John J. Audley, Green 
Politics and Global Trade: NAFTA and the Future of Environmental Politics 73 
(1997). 
 101. Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 412–13 (1993). 
 102. E.g., Charlie Savage, Pakistan Case Tests Laws on Diplomatic Immunity, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 23, 2011, at A7. 
Cohen FTP 1_C.doc 3/7/2013 2:35 PM 
266 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 34:249 
was released from Pakistani custody after an unclear source made payments 
to the families of the two people he had shot.103 
Importantly, achieving the divergent outcomes or goals of adjudication 
and negotiation requires the production of different types of legal rules. 
Deciding authoritatively the rightfulness or wrongfulness of each side’s 
conduct requires a host of specific rules regarding, among other things, 
liability (whether strict liability or negligence or forms of accomplice 
liability) and burdens of proof. These types of rules may be produced in the 
negotiation context but need not be. “ ‘Settlement facts’ may indeed be 
different from ‘adjudication facts.’ ”104 In contrast, negotiation will 
emphasize other legal questions like the presence of “good faith” in the 
conduct of the parties’ relations.105 This difference has become particularly 
apparent in the efforts of international criminal tribunals and domestic 
courts to find rules regarding individual and corporate liability for violations 
of international law. Criminal trials and civil actions in the United States 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act require clear liability rules in order to fairly 
assign blame while meeting standards of due process, legality, and nulla 
poena sine lege.106 Given customary international law’s general development 
through negotiation and jawboning, contexts in which such rules may be 
neither necessary nor desirable, such rules are difficult to find.107 
Again, the key here, as with rule clarity above, is that these differences 
are not random. They stem from the fact that adjudication and negotiation 
often serve different purposes and goals. Adjudicatory law, like adjudica-
tion, has developed to foster justice and finality. Negotiated law has 
developed with an eye toward “peace,” continuity, and ongoing relation-
ships. 
3. Speed and Path Dependence 
A third, related difference between adjudicated and negotiated law 
concerns speed and directionality. As noted above, adjudication generally 
produces much clearer outcomes108 and rules than negotiation. Almost by 
                                                                                                                           
 103. E.g., Carlotta Gall & Mark Mazzetti, Hushed Deal Frees C.I.A. Contractor in Paki-
stan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 2011, at A1; Greg Miller & Pamela Constable, CIA Contractor 
Raymond Davis Freed After “Blood Money” Payment, Wash. Post, Mar. 16, 2011, at A1.  
 104. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 52, at 2685. 
 105. See Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Real-
ism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 325, 382–83 (1995) 
(discussing how business communities develop understandings of “good faith”); William A. 
Klein & Mitu Gulati, Economic Organization in the Construction Industry: A Case Study of 
Collaborative Production Under High Uncertainty, 1 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 137, 164–66 
(2004) (discussing the importance of “good faith” in the construction and film industries). 
 106. The Alien Tort Claims Act grants the district courts “original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty 
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011). U.S. federal courts have struggled to find the 
proper standards for liability for international law violations. See infra note 295. Compare 
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), with Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 107. See Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 1073–78. 
 108. Specifically, adjudication produces clearer resolutions of the contested legal issues. 
See supra Part I.B.1. Raymond Davis going free was obviously a clear “outcome” of the nego-
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necessity, such rules create a focal point for future decisions and future 
interpretations.109 This is true regardless of the exact rules regarding 
precedent. Even in a system without formal precedent, the rules produced 
through adjudication cannot be ignored.110 A prior court’s decision 
“provides a good reason or justification why the subsequent decision should 
be as argued, all other things being equal,”111 and becomes a “real 
constraint”112 “clutter[ing] previously unencumbered argumentative 
freedom.”113 Embedding such rules within a system of adjudication 
magnifies the effect. “Cases unavoidably add layer upon layer of judicial 
gloss to the understanding of law, which eventually becomes thick and 
encrusted and thus increasingly hard to break out of.”114 Where adjudication 
is reasonably frequent, it creates a self-perpetuating engine for law 
elaboration. Interpretations easily build on one another, allowing the law on 
an issue to develop very rapidly. “Precedents can thus lead to path-
dependency by organising complex environments and creating 
argumentative frameworks, be it directly or more obliquely.”115 
In contrast, settlements, by obscuring questions like liability and 
responsibility (or even whether a rule was agreed upon), leave a great deal 
of room for future argument over the exact rule the settlement stood for, 
slowing the process of elaboration considerably.116 Precedents developing 
out of negotiated contexts will be more ambiguous and contestable,117 new 
                                                                                                                           
tiations between the United States and Pakistan, if albeit a practical, as opposed to legal, one. 
See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text. Thank you to Tim Meyer for clarifying this 
point. 
 109. Sturm & Gadlin, supra note 66, at 2–3 (“Adjudication elaborates public norms by 
developing binding precedents in a particular case, which will then apply in the future to com-
parable cases.”). 
 110. See Marc Jacob, Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication, 12 
German L.J. 1005, 1019 (2011) (“[D]eliberately ignoring relevant prior decisions is so arbi-
trary and artificial a suggestion as to verge on farce.”); see also Hall, supra note 37, at 152 
(“On the continent of Europe no such effect is theoretically attributed to judicial decisions, but 
in recent years the greatly increasing citation of former decisions by the courts with a visible 
reluctance to depart from them has made the difference in practice between the Continental 
and the Anglo-American systems one of degree only. Similarly, judicial precedents in interna-
tional law have great weight as authorities, especially where rendered by nationally impartial 
tribunals composed of recognized experts in the subject.”). 
 111. Jacob, supra note 110, at 1024. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.; see also id. at 1019 (“[D]eliberately ignoring relevant prior decisions is so arbi-
trary and artificial a suggestion as to verge on farce.”). 
 114. Id. at 1024. 
 115. Id. at 1015. 
 116. See Oppenheim, supra note 88, at 40 (“The growth of the law through custom goes 
on very slowly and gradually.”).  
 117. See, e.g., David M. Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is, 34 
Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 333, 348–50 (2006) (complicating and contextualizing the U.S. Civil 
War incidents between the United States and the United Kingdom used as examples in Jack L. 
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law 225 (2005)); see also 
Hall, supra note 37, at 153 (“Important questions of municipal law are almost certain to be 
forced into the courts soon after they arise, and a decision one way or the other tends to clear 
the air of the defeated theories, for no one can long seriously maintain that the law is some-
thing which the courts are patently deciding in actual controversies that it is not. But, in the 
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negotiation can much more freely ignore the purported rules that other 
negotiations may have stood for, and it may take many interactions over a 
long period of time before a single clear rule seems to emerge.118 Writing 
about alternative dispute resolution, for example, Susan Sturm and Howard 
Gadlin describe the process through which “informal [public] norms often 
inform formal policy and law” as one of “reiteration, coordination and 
revalidation.”119 In the U.S. separation-of-powers context, this often means 
requiring “repetition and longevity,”120 “consistency,” “duration,” and 
“continuity,”121 or “unbroken” practice,122 before distilling a rule from 
custom. The paradigmatic description of this process within international 
law can be seen in the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in the Paquete 
Habana, tracing hundreds of years of zigzagging state practice regarding the 
immunity of small fishing vessels from wartime capture to discover a 
“gradually ripening” rule of customary international law.123 
Again, importantly, within negotiated law, this slower pace is seen as a 
virtue; rules develop in light of the lived life of the rule. As Glennon writes 
of U.S. separation-of-powers custom: “Custom draws vitality as a source of 
authority from its utility as a reality-tester; the act constituting it has been 
carried out over a period of time, and found workable.”124 Developing in 
increments over time, explains Spiro, “moors the law in the full texture of 
our experience as a national community.”125 In the conventional account of 
custom, Schauer explains, “as mistakes are corrected more often than sound 
practices are discarded, then over time custom gets better . . . and the law is 
to be praised for drawing on and treating it as authoritative.”126 
4. Legitimacy 
As has already been noted, the differences between negotiated and ad-
judicated law are in many ways a function of the different values they serve. 
But the differences run even deeper than that. As the settlement scholars are 
quick to point out, negotiated and adjudicated resolutions draw authority 
from different sources of both sociological and normative legitimacy. 
                                                                                                                           
absence of any internationally binding authority upon many important questions of interna-
tional law, rival experts may announce and adhere to the most conflicting theories with the 
greatest confidence and pertinacity.”). 
 118. See Schauer, supra note 39, at 31 (“Customs change, and they generally do so in 
incremental response to new acts, events, decisions, and interpretations.”). 
 119. Sturm & Gadlin, supra note 66, at 52. 
 120. Spiro, supra note 49, at 1015. 
 121. Glennon, supra note 50, at 146–47. 
 122. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring). 
 123. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900); see also Hall, supra note 37, at 155 
(“In international matters a nation may do the same—but, owing to the lack of compulsory 
tribunals for the decision of such controversies, years or even generations may elapse before it 
can be said that the proposed change has become effective or has been defeated.”).  
 124. Glennon, supra note 50, at 135. 
 125. Spiro, supra note 49, at 1034. 
 126. Schauer, supra note 39, at 32. 
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Negotiated rules invoke principles of party autonomy and consent.127 
They also invoke notions of compromise and practical justice. Rules devel-
op slowly in light of practical realities, always leaving room for 
reassessment along the way. As mentioned above, separation-of-powers cus-
tom, for example, derives its authority from its time-testedness—“the act 
constituting it has been carried out over a period of time, and found worka-
ble.”128 
Arbitration can likewise derive legitimacy from consent. Adjudication, 
however, requires more. It may invoke implicit or explicit delegations of 
authority,129 neutrality,130 finality,131 or reasoned decision making132—
sources very different from those invoked in defense of negotiated rules.133 
This can be seen in constant critiques of decisions by constitutional courts—
the claims are often that lawmaking has not been delegated to the court, that 
the people’s representatives agreed to something else, or that decisions are 
not neutral. 
Importantly, these notions of legitimacy are not only different from 
those undergirding negotiated law, but may at times be in conflict with 
them; neutrality, expertise, and reasoned decision making may all require 
ignoring party wishes.134 Finality may be in conflict with the flexible ambi-
guity, the potential for renegotiation that supports negotiated law. These 
legitimacy distinctions thus give the practical distinctions between the two 
                                                                                                                           
 127. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 52, at 2669–70 (describing the values supporting set-
tlement as including “consent, participation, empowerment, dignity, respect, empathy and 
emotional catharsis, privacy, efficiency, quality solutions, equity, access, and yes, even jus-
tice”); see also Spiro, supra note 49, at 981 (“It is ultimately the acceptance of the 
congressional-executive agreement by the President, the Congress, and the People themselves 
that drapes it with constitutional legitimacy.”). 
 128. Glennon, supra note 50, at 135. 
 129. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 185 (discussing this distinction in the investment tri-
bunal context). 
 130. Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 Geo. 
Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 107, 121 (2009) (identifying the “perception that the tribunal is fair and 
unbiased” as a key factor in its perceived legitimacy); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L.J. 273, 312–
14 (1997).  
 131. Wallace D. Loh, Social Research in the Judicial Process: Cases, Readings, 
and Text 530 (1984) (“The perceived legitimacy of adjudication depends in part on its au-
thoritative finality.”). 
 132. See Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1011, 1014–15 (2007); see also J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and 
the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute 
Settlement, 13 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 177, 193 (2002) (“The legitimacy of courts rests in grand 
part on their capacity to listen to the parties, to deliberate impartially favoring neither the 
powerful nor the meek, to have the courage to decide and then, crucially, to motivate and ex-
plain the decisions.”). 
 133. Sturm & Gadlin, supra note 66, at 52 (“[Adjudication presumes] a particular idea of 
public [decision making]—the formal declaration of general rules by courts or legislatures—
and a particular conception of how public values emerge from conflict resolution—through 
Socratic reasoning from binding precedent.”).  
 134. In the words of Carrie Menkel-Meadow: “Do the parties, whose dispute is being 
settled, or the public, who needs guidance from enunciated rules, control the judgment?” 
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 52, at 2679. 
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legal ideal types normative resonance and relevance, setting up stark choic-
es. 
5. Summary 
The chart below attempts to summarize the various differences between 
the ideal types of negotiated and adjudicated law: 
 
 Negotiated Law Adjudicated Law 
Clarity of Rules Ambiguous, Open to 
Interpretation 
Clearer, More Predictable in 
Application 
Pace of Development Slow, Incremental Potentially Fast, Path-
Dependent 
Method of Development Practical Experience Reasoned Elaboration 
Intended Outcome Flexibility, Potential for 
Renegotiation 
Certainty, Finality 
Goal Continuing Relationship, 
Peace 
Justice 
Sources of Legitimacy Consent, Autonomy, 
Compromise, Pragmatism 
Delegation, Neutrality, 
Expertise, Reasoning, Finality 
 
What should be becoming clearer is that “customary law” developed 
through adjudication is fundamentally different in kind from the customary 
law developed through community practice.135 Developed for different pur-
poses, these rules differ in shape. Developed through different processes by 
different actors, these rules invoke different forms of legitimacy. Of course, 
looking at this chart, one will immediately think of examples of trials or 
negotiations that do not fit the bill, to which one or more of these supposed 
attributes do not attach. But the constant invocation of these attributes in the 
literature demonstrates the deep justificatory role the ideal types play.136 
These differences between adjudicated law and negotiated law compli-
cate the transposition of rules from one context to the other. At a practical 
level, the two may simply be mismatched. For example, negotiated-law 
rules intended to be open ended may have their possibilities closed off in 
adjudication’s quest for clarity.137 But at a deeper, more theoretical level, 
applying in one context rules developed in another presents a paradox. 
Courts cannot apply custom without essentially destroying it. The develop-
ment of “custom” via adjudication is not merely a continuation of that rule’s 
development, but its transformation into something new.138 Some process of 
                                                                                                                           
 135. True, the common law is often described as a type of customary law. But insofar as 
that is the case, it is a customary law of courts rather than a customary law of the external 
community. 
 136. Individual adjudications or negotiations will stray from their ideal attributes, but 
they can’t stray too far without raising questions about their legitimacy. 
 137. See infra Part II.B for potential, though controversial, examples.  
 138. Hall, supra note 37, at 151–52 (“Thus, a rule may have originated in custom, pro-
fessional opinion, public policy, or even in a statute, but, once it has been declared in a judicial 
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translation, explicit or implicit, is needed in order to turn the rules developed 
in one setting into rules usable in the other. 
This realization is not, in fact, new. Early common law lawyers had to 
come to terms with a similar problem in the transposition of community 
custom into common law rules. As early as 1610, Thomas Hedley was 
distinguishing the “artificial reason” of the common law from the “bare 
precedents” of custom.139 As Michael Lobban explains: 
[C]ommon lawyers did not feel that community practices could by 
themselves generate binding norms. In their view, while community 
custom provided the historical foundation of the common law, its 
development was the preserve of judges. Community practices were 
only permitted to derogate from the common law where they were 
ancient and unchanging; and old common law could not be abro-
gated by new custom. Equally, although judges could incorporate 
newer customs and practices—whether domestic or international—
in developing the common law, their authority and validity derived 
from the judicial decision and not from the custom itself.140 
English common law thus developed a mechanism for translating custom 
from practice to adjudication. Customs could be looked to for rules, but the 
resulting rules were controlled by judges rather than the community and 
elaborated through common law reasoning rather than community practice. 
International law is now in need of a similar set of translation rules. What 
will they be? 
II. From Diplomacy to Arbitration to Adjudication 
Figuring out what role courts and tribunals should play in interpreting 
or articulating international law is a relatively recent problem. It is only over 
the last century that the arbitration or adjudication of international law dis-
putes has become frequent enough to really raise concerns. This Part traces 
the historical development of international adjudication from the late nine-
teenth-century enthusiasm for arbitration through the creation of the PCIJ 
and up to today’s flowering of courts, tribunals, and other interpretive bod-
ies. It then continues by looking more closely at problems created by asking 
courts to apply negotiated law, demonstrating through three examples—(1) 
the interpretation of international investment treaties, (2) the use of diplo-
matic assurances in Europe, and (3) the availability of self-defense against 
                                                                                                                           
decision (in the case of a statute taking the form of an interpretation of the legislative mean-
ing), succeeding cases of like import are almost certain to be decided upon the authority of the 
previous decision, which, by frequent references of this character, finally becomes not only 
practically but theoretically almost as fixed a part of the law as even a statute that it inter-
prets.”). 
 139. 2 Proceedings in Parliament 1610, at 175–76 (Elizabeth R. Forster ed., 1966). 
As Michael Lobban explains, “The common law was not developed in the community by the 
people, but was developed in court by the ‘artificial reason’ of judges.” Michael Lobban, Cus-
tom, Common Law Reasoning and the Law of Nations in the Nineteenth Century, in The 
Nature of Customary Law, supra note 39, at 256, 258.  
 140. See Lobban, supra note 139, at 257. 
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nonstate actors—how the jurisprudence of international courts and the state 
practice those courts are theoretically interpreting can start to diverge. 
A. The Rise of International Adjudication 
1. The Path to Courts 
International tribunals have been around almost as long as international 
law. Herodotus and Thucydides both recount stories of arbitration among 
ancient Greek city-states.141 A number of famous ancient Greek interpolis 
arbitrations actually turned on interpretations of Homer,142 and the treaty es-
tablishing the thirty-year peace between Athens and Sparta famously included 
a clause requiring arbitration of disputes.143 And the tradition continued 
through ancient times into the Middle Ages.144 A modern era of international 
arbitration was inaugurated by the 1794 Jay Treaty between the United States 
and the United Kingdom and its provision for the arbitration of disputes 
between the two parties.145 But arbitration remained rare and ad hoc until the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, when the success of the high-profile, 
high-stakes Alabama arbitration between the United States and the United 
Kingdom,146 combined with a growing international peace movement, gen-
erated new enthusiasm for arbitration and the peaceful settlement of 
interstate disputes.147 
This enthusiasm culminated in the establishment first of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference and later, in 1922, 
                                                                                                                           
 141. See, e.g., Herodotus, The Histories 342, 366 (Carolyn Dewald ed., Robin Water-
field trans., Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 2008) (c. 425 B.C.E.); Thucydides, The 
Peloponnesian War 15–21 (Steven Lattimore trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1998) (c. 411 
B.C.E.). 
 142. See John M. Wickersham, Myth and Identity in the Archaic Polis, in Myth and 
the Polis 16, 16–31 (Dora C. Pozzi & John M. Wickersham eds., 1991). 
 143. See Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War 128 (1969) 
(explaining how Sparta’s refusal to go to arbitration as agreed helped precipitate the Second 
Peloponnesian War); Jackson H. Ralston, International Arbitration from Athens to 
Locarno 155–68 (1929) (detailing arbitral practice among the ancient Greeks); Christian 
Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institu-
tional Rationality in International Relations 58–59 (1999). 
 144. See Ralston, supra note 143, at 174–89. 
 145. See Carla S. Copeland, Note, The Use of Arbitration to Settle Territorial Disputes, 
67 Fordham L. Rev. 3073, 3073 (1999). 
 146. The Alabama was a Confederate raider responsible for numerous attacks on Union 
ships built in Britain allegedly in violation of British neutrality during the U.S. Civil War. See 
Mark Weston Janis, Americans and the Quest for an Ethical International Law, 109 W. Va. L. 
Rev. 571, 596–99 (2007). 
 147. E.g., id. at 580–89; ICJ History, supra note 35. These trends were further buttressed 
by the simultaneous emergence of arbitration as a primary means for resolving alien-
protection disputes between the United States and Latin American states. See Alan T. Nissel, 
Big Stick Arbitration 31–35 (Jan. 4, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
Nissel makes the compelling case that it was in these arbitrations that the modern practices of 
international dispute resolution were developed. Given the centrality of U.S. statesmen-
lawyers in the development of early international arbitral and adjudicatory bodies, this should 
not be surprising. 
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of the PCIJ.148 After World War II, the PCIJ was replaced by the ICJ,149 and 
over time additional courts and tribunals have been created, such as the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1952150 and the ECHR in 1959.151 Since the 
end of the Cold War, however, the number of international courts, tribunals, 
and other adjudicatory or interpretative bodies has exploded. According to 
one count, there are now 142 “international institutions controlling imple-
mentation of international law and/or settling disputes arising out of its 
interpretation and implementation.”152 These range from formal courts es-
tablished under multilateral treaties, like the Law of the Sea Tribunal, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body, and the International 
Criminal Court; courts or tribunals established under regional human rights 
agreements, like the ECHR, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and 
the African Court of Justice; courts or tribunals established under regional 
economic agreements, like the ECJ, NAFTA tribunals, Mercosur arbitration 
panels and appellate body, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community 
of Western African States, and the Court of Justice of the Andean Communi-
ty; ad hoc or hybrid international criminal tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Cambodia, and Lebanon; 
quasi-judicial expert bodies with authority to hear individual complaints 
under a range of human rights treaties; and what has been described as “an 
emerging system” of investor-state investment tribunals called for under the 
vast array of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).153 These bodies can be ex-
traordinarily hard to classify given that they differ dramatically in 
permanence, structure, and the bindingness of their decisions, among other 
things,154 and those listed here form merely the very tip of a very large ice-
berg. What these bodies share in common is that they are delegated some 
authority to interpret international law and its application to specific dis-
putes and situations. 
                                                                                                                           
 148. Permanent Court of Arbitration, Hague Just. Portal, http:// 
www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=311 (last visited Feb. 10, 2013); Permanent Court 
of International Justice, The Hague Justice Portal, http://www.hague 
justiceportal.net/index.php?id=6340 (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). 
 149. International Court of Justice, Hague Just. Portal, http://www. 
haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=305 (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). 
 150. European Court of Justice, Eurofound, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/ 
industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/europeancourtofjustice.htm (last updated Sept. 21, 
2011); The Institution: General Presentation, Curia, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/ 
jcms/Jo2_6999/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). 
 151.  Eur. Court of Human Rights, The Court in Brief (2012), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF074FE4-96C2-4384-BFF6-404AAF5BC585/0/ENG 
_Court_in_brief.pdf. 
 152. Cesare P.R. Romano, A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions, 2 J. 
Int’l Disp. Settlement 241, 241–42 (2011).  
 153. E.g., Schill, supra note 26, at 24; Alvarez, supra note 70, at 17; Andreas F. Low-
enfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 123, 128 
(2003). 
 154. Perhaps the most comprehensive effort has been made by Cesare Romano. Roma-
no, supra note 152, at 241. For additional discussions of the type of tribunals existing in 
Europe and the functions they perform, see generally Karen J. Alter, The European 
Court’s Political Power: Selected Essays, at ix (2009). 
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It was the PCIJ Statute that first grappled with the legal sources 
international courts would apply. Article 38 of the Statute, later incorporated 
into the Statute of the ICJ, laid out the sources to be used in cases before the 
court, and it is from here that we get the doctrinal rule that courts are to 
apply the rules created by states in their interactions with one another.155 
Aside from “international conventions,” the PCIJ was to apply “international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,” and “[t]he 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”156 Interestingly, 
despite stated hopes of court proponents like Manley Hudson that the PCIJ 
would be a force for the reasoned elaboration of the law,157 the potential 
conflict between this goal and the PCIJ’s mandate to track state practice 
seems to have raised few concerns at the time of drafting. The inclusion of 
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,”158 
seems to have elicited little debate. On the contrary, James Brown Scott, 
Technical Delegate of the United States to the Conference that drafted the 
Statute, described the list of sources eventually codified in Article 38 as “not 
only acceptable in themselves but . . . in accordance with the decisions of 
English and American courts of justice, both as to the law and as to the rules 
of interpretation.”159 And if anything, the goal seems to have been to 
constrain the judges of the new court to apply only those rules created by 
states, whether by treaty or by customary practice.160 As Scott explains, “the 
Committee [drawing up the Statute] was anxious to quiet the apprehensions 
of the parties that the judges might make an undue use of their power and, 
by the interpretation of their jurisdiction, assume the role of legislator.”161 
The ICJ Statute emphasizes this point by reducing judicial opinions to mere 
subsidiary sources162 and by denying decisions precedential force.163 
Essentially, the court was to be limited to applying negotiated law. 
Now often referred to as international law’s doctrine of sources, Article 
38, together with relevant rules of treaty interpretation codified in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, has since become the template for other 
judicial or quasi-judicial bodies tasked with applying or interpreting interna-
                                                                                                                           
 155. ICJ Statute, supra note 4, art. 38. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice 1920–
1942: A Treatise § 545 (1943). 
 158. ICJ Statute, supra note 4, art. 38(b). 
 159. James Brown Scott, The Project of a Permanent Court of International 
Justice and Resolutions of the Advisory Committee of Jurists: Report and Com-
mentary 107 (1920). 
 160. This becomes apparent in the provision of Article 38 that did apparently result in 
some debate among the delegates drafting it: that referring to “general principles of law.” ICJ 
Statute, supra note 4, art. 38(c). The language eventually chosen was meant to provide a 
means of judicial gap filling that would nonetheless be constrained by some form of state 
consent. See G.J.H. van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law 136–39 
(1983); Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of 
State Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 275, 307–08 (2008). 
 161. Scott, supra note 159, at 107. 
 162. ICJ Statute, supra note 4, art. 38(d). 
 163. Id. art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the 
parties and in respect of that particular case.”). 
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tional law.164 These bodies regularly recite oaths of loyalty to these tradi-
tional sources.165 But perhaps demonstrating the inherent difficulty 
translating negotiated law into adjudicated law, various courts and tribunals 
have found themselves swaying farther and farther from Article 38, whether 
intentionally or not. 
Across a wide swath of international law, from international trade166 to 
international investment arbitration,167 international human rights168 to inter-
national criminal law,169 precedent and jurisprudence have emerged as 
important, if unspoken, sources, notwithstanding the PCIJ (and later ICJ) 
Statute’s embrace of negotiated law and denial of precedential effect to court 
                                                                                                                           
 164. Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of 
Sources, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 65, 69, 75–76 (2007) [hereinafter Cohen, Finding International Law 
I]; Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Communi-
ty, 44 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1049, 1056–59, 1069 (2012) [hereinafter Cohen, Finding 
International Law II]. 
 165. See Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 1075 n.55 (collecting such cases from the juris-
prudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY]); Theodor 
Meron, Editorial Comment, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 817, 
821 (2005) (“[I]nternational criminal tribunals have taken an essentially conservative and 
traditional approach to the identification and application of customary international law prin-
ciples.”); see also Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Customs Classification of 
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R (Sept. 12, 2005) (basing 
decision in WTO case on VCLT rules); U.N. Human Rights Comm. [U.N. HRC], General 
Comment No. 26(61): General Comment on Issues Relating to the Continuity of Obligations 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997) [hereinafter U.N. HRC, General Comment No. 
26(61)] (using VCLT to interpret the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); 
U.N. HRC, General Comment No. 24: General Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations 
Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in 
Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 11, 1994) [hereinafter U.N. HRC, General Comment No. 24]. 
 166. E.g., Bhala, supra note 27, at 850; Howse, supra note 27, at 223; Lanye, supra note 
27, at 230.  
 167. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Final Award, ¶ 129 (Jan. 
26, 2006), reprinted in 6 Asper Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 419, 571 (2006) (“In 
international and international economic law—to which investment arbitration properly 
belongs—there may not be a formal ‘stare decisis’ rule as in common law countries, but 
precedent plays an important role. Tribunals and courts may disagree and are at full liberty to 
deviate from specific awards, but it is hard to maintain that they can and should not respect 
well-established jurisprudence.”); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 
Fordham L. Rev. 1521, 1611–12 (2005) (“The fact is that investment awards are not 
technically precedential. . . . As a practical matter, however, private investors, governments, 
and arbitral tribunals rely on previous awards to interpret similar provisions in investment 
treaties.”); Matthew Belz, Comment, Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty: 
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia and Improving Provisional Application in Multilateral Treaties, 22 
Emory Int’l L. Rev. 727, 752 (2008) (“Second, there is strong pressure on arbitrators to 
follow other tribunals’ decisions, even though stare decisis does not govern international 
arbitration. As stated by one . . . scholar, ‘[t]he reasoning of almost all modern arbitral awards 
demonstrate [sic] the great care investment arbitral tribunals apply to ensure they are 
positioned in the mainstream of emerging jurisprudence.’ ” (alteration to internal quotation in 
original)).  
 168. See Binder, supra note 28, at 1203–05. 
 169. See Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 1073–78. 
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decisions. In some areas, the traditional sources seem unable to provide the 
rules courts need in order to fulfill their mandates. This has become most 
stark in the international criminal context; determining an individual’s crim-
inal liability for a violation of international law requires clear rules 
regarding forms of liability, burdens of proof, and mens rea that have not 
and could not have been worked out through traditional state practice.170 
Instead, courts have by necessity looked to the practice of international and 
domestic courts for answers.171 The result is an international adjudicatory 
common law that must disguise itself as custom lest those courts overstep 
their mandates.172 And in still other areas, international law’s recognition of 
new rights holders beyond the state, whether individuals in the human rights 
context or investors in the investment context, has made reliance on the 
practice of states seem anachronistic or paradoxical.173 It is reining in the 
practice of states, of course, that is the purpose of the law in these areas. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, reconciling the mandate to protect individuals with 
the mandate to apply traditional sources of international law has forced 
these bodies to reinterpret notions of custom to deemphasize state practice174 
and to assert their independent authority to elaborate the objects and pur-
poses of the treaties before them.175 
2. The Path to Precedent 
Given this drift toward adjudicated law, one must wonder, why didn’t 
the articulation of negotiated law by a permanent court raise more red flags 
for the drafters of the PCIJ Statute? Why weren’t the difficulties translating 
between the legitimacy of negotiation and the legitimacy of adjudication 
more apparent? Should the drafters have anticipated these developments? 
What seems to have been missed in the transposition of custom to 
courts, in the adoption of arbitral rules as judicial rules, are the systemic 
effects of creating a system of courts.176 Although some of the theoretical 
                                                                                                                           
 170. Id. at 1080–81. 
 171. See id. at 1075–77, 1076 n.60 (“[T]he Trial Chamber must examine customary 
international law in order to establish the content of this head of criminal responsibility . . . .” 
(quoting Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 191, 193 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 172.  Cohen, Finding International Law II, supra note 164, at 1078–79. 
 173. Id. at 1078–79, 1084; see also Alvarez, supra note 70, at 47 (“[Investment arbitra-
tion decisions] are also more likely to offer useful ‘neutral’ guidance for law interpreters than 
diplomatic actions by self-interested states.”). 
 174. See Roberts, supra note 21, at 758–59. 
 175. See U.N. HRC, General Comment No. 26(61), supra note 165, ¶ 5; Cohen, Finding 
International Law II, supra note 164, at 1073–74. Additionally, precedent may be a natural 
response to the changing nature and audience of these and other more modern areas of inter-
national law. In a variety of areas, human rights and trade most notably, the treaty makers are 
often not the most important compliance agents. Domestic audiences, both judges and legisla-
tors, may be the ones who must act to implement particular obligations. Appeals to precedent 
may signal both neutrality and rule-of-law values that might make more of an impact on those 
actors.  
 176. As Scott describes, the definition of custom in the Permanent Court of International 
Justice Statute appears to have been borrowed wholesale from earlier arbitral tribunals and 
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difficulties with adjudicating negotiated law may be present even in the del-
egation of a single dispute to an ad hoc tribunal, it is only with increased 
frequency, density, and transparency of judicial proceedings that these prob-
lems become manifest. One of the lessons of the literature on precedent in 
international law is that appeal to prior decisions depends little on the actual 
rules regarding precedent, but rather on the density and frequency of adjudi-
cation as compared to other sources.177 The emerging literature on the 
evolving “system” of international investment arbitration is particularly il-
lustrative here, given that it depends on the density of decisions by many 
tribunals rather than the authority of a single one.178 In essence, the weight 
carried by precedent is a function of the discursive burden prior interpreta-
tions place on future arguments about a rule. As a feature of legal 
argumentation, once a body with some authority179 interprets a rule, any 
future discussion of the rule must take that interpretation into account, even 
if to argue that it is wrong; further interpretations along the same lines make 
the burden of dismissing it even harder.180 This helps explain why the use of 
the orthodox definition of custom by infrequent, ad hoc arbitral tribunals 
was less problematic: those tribunals’ decisions, which might be washed away 
in a sea of state practice,181 exerted less pull on the rule than do decisions by 
                                                                                                                           
domestic courts. See Scott, supra note 159, at 106–11. Little thought seems to have been 
given to why a permanent court might need different rules. 
 177. See Jacob, supra note 110, at 1020 (“[T]he shaping of international law is owed to 
the cumulative effect of the often unnoticed tweaking and tinkering constantly carried out 
regarding issues that do not usually arouse the hotter convictions of men and women.”). 
 178. See e.g., Schill, supra note 26, at 14; Roberts, supra note 2, at 180, 204, 216. 
 179. This, of course, raises other questions that cannot fully be discussed here regarding 
when or why certain bodies will be seen as authoritative. The factors that might make a body 
authoritative likely differ with circumstances; different audiences, formal delegation, profes-
sionalism, expertise, neutrality, or opinion-writing style might all be more or less important to 
a body’s perceived authority. 
 180. Some international tribunals have explained their use of precedent along similar 
lines. For example, the WTO Appellate Body has explained:  
It is well settled that Appellate Body reports are not binding . . . . This, however, 
does not mean that subsequent panels are free to disregard the legal interpretations 
and the ratio decidendi contained in previous Appellate Body reports that have been 
adopted by the [Dispute Settlement Body]. . . . Ensuring “security and predictabil-
ity” in the dispute settlement system, as contemplated in Article 3.2 of the [Dispute 
Settlement Understanding], implies that, absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory 
body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case. 
Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from 
Mexico, ¶¶ 158, 159–162 & n.309, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008). In essence, responding 
to prior decisions is simply a requirement of reasoned decision making. See Int’l Thunderbird 
Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Final Award, ¶ 129 (Jan. 26, 2006), reprinted in 6 
Asper Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 419, 571 (2006) (“Tribunals and courts may disagree and 
are at full liberty to deviate from specific awards, but it is hard to maintain that they can and 
should not respect well-established jurisprudence.”). 
 181. Cf. Frank Partnoy, Synthetic Common Law, 53 U. Kan. L. Rev. 281, 323 n.179 
(2005) (“Each arbitrator therefore owes no more than ‘due regard’ to the decisions of other 
arbitrators. Nor is there complete publication of awards. Those published form only a small, 
and not necessarily representative, portion of the whole. Many parties have no convenient 
access to the publishing services, and many parties forego the use of lawyers who could dis-
cover and argue the pertinent precedents.”). 
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modern bodies, which may actually decide cases faster (developing what 
might quickly look like a consensus interpretation) than state practice can 
play out. This also explains why the formal nature of a tribunal may matter 
less than its ability to claim authoritative interpretative power. An expert 
body under a human rights treaty may put as much burden on future argu-
ments as a decision of a formal court; an ICJ advisory opinion, technically 
nonbinding but purportedly a neutral interpretation of a rule, may act more 
like precedent than a decision under the ICJ’s binding contentious jurisdic-
tion that merely resolves a fact-specific dispute between two states.182 
These system effects are compounded as increasing opportunities for 
arbitration and adjudication produce an international litigation bar across a 
wide range of areas.183 Whether private attorneys or government lawyers, 
lawyers focused on international adjudication have many reasons to find 
precedent attractive. They may have been socialized into a professional cul-
ture that reifies precedent’s apparent neutrality and predictability. Appeals to 
precedent might dovetail with their professional training and skills. And for 
repeat players in the system, predictability in decision making may be some-
thing they both demand from tribunals and sell to clients, namely, expertise 
in predicting results and in advising on arguments. 
Importantly, these system effects may arise not only from the increased 
use of courts and tribunals in one area of international law, but also across 
all of them.184 Courts or tribunals in one area of law may have a hard time 
ignoring decisions in other areas interpreting common or similar provi-
sions.185 An obvious example is the appearance of human rights body 
precedents in the decisions of investment arbitral tribunals.186 In essence, a 
                                                                                                                           
 182. Cf. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Common Law: The Soft 
Law of International Tribunals, 9 Chi. J. Int’l L. 515, 516–17 (2009) (making the point that 
despite technically being nonbinding, the decisions of bodies like the Human Rights Commit-
tee can influence expectations about what particular rules mean and, in turn, can affect states’ 
reputations for compliance or noncompliance). Although we use different terminology—in 
Guzman and Meyer’s case “soft law,” in mine “precedent”—I believe the point is substantially 
the same: authoritative interpretative decisions by international bodies inevitably shape the 
meaning of the rules they interpret. 
 183. See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International 
Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order 3 
(1996) (discussing international arbitration bar); John Hagan & Ron Levi, Social Skill, the 
Milosevic Indictment, and the Rebirth of International Criminal Justice, 1 Eur. J. Criminol-
ogy 446 (2004) (criminal law bar); Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and 
Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. (forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at 21), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2033167.  
 184. These effects are moreover compounded by a parallel increase in the interpretation 
of international law by domestic courts. A full discussion of the role of precedent in interna-
tional law would have to include these courts as well. For a much fuller discussion of the 
complex, hybrid, perhaps even schizophrenic, role of national courts in interpreting interna-
tional law, see generally Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The Role of 
National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 60 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 57, 
73–81 (2011). 
 185. This may be particularly important given that precedent may be more attractive in 
certain more modern areas of international law. See Roberts, supra note 21, at 788–89. 
 186. E.g., Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in 
Denial of Justice Claims, 45 Va. J. Int’l L. 809, 885–86 (2005); Andrea Bjorklund & Sophie 
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developed jurisprudence with regard to fair-trial rights in human rights law 
may make a “denial of justice” provision in an investment treaty seem less 
unclear and less like a gap purposefully left open by states. This system ef-
fect confounds attempts by states to carefully design and calibrate the 
powers of tribunals at the front end and may be something lost in rationalist 
approaches to the creation of courts and tribunals. A state might predict that 
over time, with increased decision making, a court like the ECJ or ECHR 
might grow in influence and its decisions might be harder to ignore. It is 
hard to imagine, however, that in designing a settlement regime for one area 
of international law—say investment arbitration—states are thinking about 
the system effects of the simultaneous development of tribunals in other 
areas. Predicting the future course of a single dispute resolution system may 
be difficult; trying to predict how all of these systems will develop and the 
influence they may exert on one another seems nearly impossible. It should 
not be surprising that these developments would have been beyond the 
thinking of the drafters of the PCIJ Statute. 
Nor could the PCIJ Statute’s drafters have likely predicted the radical 
expansion of international law’s subject matter and how new areas of gov-
ernance might make precedent more attractive or valuable. In a variety of 
areas, human rights and trade most notably, the treaty makers are often not 
the most important compliance agents. Domestic audiences, both judges and 
legislators, may be the ones who must act to implement particular obliga-
tions. A court may need to order compliance with or accept an international 
decision;187 legislators may need to be persuaded to change a state’s laws. 
Appeals to precedent may signal both neutrality and rule-of-law values that 
might make more of an impact on those actors.188 
Finally, these system effects of adjudication were likely obscured by the 
fact that despite the “ideal” of adjudicated law, adjudication actually exists 
along a spectrum with the most informal, ad hoc arbitration on one end and 
a permanent, institutionalized judiciary on the other. When a tribunal is in-
voked and constituted by the parties merely to resolve a specific dispute, it 
can reasonably claim to be acting solely at the consent of the parties. Partic-
ularly when the parties narrow the issues before the tribunal, the arbitration 
may just be a negotiated result in a specific form. The tribunal can reasonably 
“borrow” legitimacy from the parties and the rules they have established. But 
                                                                                                                           
Nappert, Beyond Fragmentation, in New Directions in International Economic Law: In 
Memoriam Thomas Wälde 439, 453–66 (Todd Weiler & Freya Baetens eds., 2011). 
 187. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (ruling that “self-
executing” treaties constitute binding domestic law); see also Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 
20 Ct. Int’l Trade 1221, 1222–23 (1996) (ordering the United States to take action eventually 
held to violate the United States’ commitments under the WTO in Panel Report, United 
States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 8.1–.2, WT/DS58/R 
(May 15, 1998)). 
 188. Cf. Erik Voeten, Does a Professional Judiciary Induce More Compliance?: Evidence 
from the European Court of Human Rights 4–6 (Mar. 27, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2029786 (finding empirical 
support that decisions by professional judges have a greater impact on compliance in the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights [ECHR] and suggesting that an explanation might be the 
respect national judges show for well-reasoned, well-crafted judicial decisions that skillfully 
cite prior precedents).  
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as the procedure for invoking the tribunal become more automatic, as the tri-
bunal becomes more permanent, as the rules applied become standardized and 
obligatory, and as authority of the tribunal increases,189 the precedential ef-
fect of the tribunal’s decisions increases and the tribunal’s ability to rely on 
direct consent decreases. It is then that the tribunal’s credit runs out; it can 
no longer rely on the legitimacy of the parties or of custom; it must rely on 
some legitimacy of its own. 
Many international law bodies exist somewhere along this spectrum: 
permanent courts whose jurisdiction depends on party consent (ICJ), or 
formal, permanent bodies of experts without the authority to issue binding 
decisions (the Human Rights Committee [HRC]). Even individual courts 
(and this is of course true in domestic law as well) may at times look more 
like arbitrators and others more like common law courts; the ICJ may be 
asked to resolve a highly fact-specific dispute between two states with lit-
tle precedential value for other situations,190 or it may be asked to issue an 
advisory opinion about a broad question of uncertain international law like 
the legality of nuclear weapons191 or the Kosovar declaration of independ-
ence.192 In fact, there is no clear line separating arbitration from 
adjudication in international law, and it is only as we get closer to the ad-
judicated-law ideal that the mismatch between sources and the need for 
additional forms of legitimacy become clear. And as noted above, the tip-
ping point may come only with increased use. 
Whatever the reasons, it is becoming harder to pretend that interna-
tional courts and tribunals merely apply the rules developed by states. This 
is becoming clearest and most dangerous in a variety of contexts in which 
the jurisprudence of international courts and the state practice it purports 
to interpret seem to be on diverging paths. 
B. Rival International Laws 
The rise and proliferation of courts, tribunals, and other bodies apply-
ing negotiated law has led to increasing disconnects between the law as 
articulated by courts and the law that might be gleaned from state practice. 
Once a court (or other body) decides the shape of state practice and the 
content of custom, that decision becomes the baseline for further judicial 
articulation of the rule. This is true even if the initial evidence of state 
practice was questionable or difficult to discern or if state practice contin-
ues to develop in a different direction from the initial opinion. The result 
can be two parallel versions of the law, one articulated by courts and an-
                                                                                                                           
 189. Of course, the last may be a result of the others. Permanent, experienced judges 
with expertise in the rules they apply are likely to be held in greater esteem. 
 190. E.g., Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22). 
 191. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, 226 (July 8). 
 192. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22). 
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other developed through actual state practice.193 Because each type of law 
invokes different types of legitimacy,194 debates over which one is correct 
become rife. In some areas, states question whether courts truly had the 
delegated authority they claim. In others, contrary state practice is por-
trayed by court backers as rogue lawlessness or obstructionism. The result 
is a legitimacy crisis for international law.195 
In each of the examples below, state practice and precedent seem to 
point in opposite directions.196 The point of these examples is not that ei-
ther the court or the states are right or wrong; international lawyers will 
undoubtedly differ over who should eventually prevail in each instance. 
The point instead is to illuminate the ways in which the unrecognized ten-
sion between the negotiated-law and adjudicated-law models fuels these 
conflicts. The differences in the operation of negotiated law and adjudicat-
ed law can result in divergent answers; the differences in the sources of 
negotiated law’s and adjudicated law’s legitimacy fuel normative argu-
ments over which one is right. 
1. Investment Tribunals As Agents or Trustees 
Investor-state arbitration is a relatively new phenomenon and one that 
puts particular pressure on the negotiated-law/adjudicated-law dichotomy. 
Until relatively recently, foreign investors had few avenues of recourse if 
their rights were violated by their host state. If, for example, the host state 
illegally expropriated their property, they could bring claims in the host 
state’s courts; failing that, investors could seek the help of their home 
states in raising their claims as the home states’ own. That picture has 
been transformed by the rising number of bilateral and regional investment 
treaties providing investors with the right to initiate binding international 
                                                                                                                           
 193. Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938) (explaining how the 
“[p]ersistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of common law prevented 
uniformity” and fueled divergences in state and federal common law). 
 194. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 195. Notably, this story is not entirely new. In prior periods in which court decisions 
interpreting international law have increased rapidly, concerns about the legitimacy of those 
courts and the resulting jurisprudence also emerged. In particular, the extraordinary density of 
purportedly authoritative prize decisions coming out of U.K. courts of admiralty during the 
Napoleonic and Revolutionary wars led to serious attacks on those courts’ authority. Even Sir 
William Scott and Lord Stowell, one of the most respected judges of his time, came under 
attack for developing a jurisprudence biased toward Britain rather than neutrally interpreting 
state practice. See James Thuo Gathii, The American Origins of Liberal and Illiberal Regimes 
of International Economic Governance in the Marshall Court, 54 Buff. L. Rev. 765, 797–98 
(2006) (discussing U.S. Chief Justice John Marshall’s criticism).  
 196. Any number of examples of conflict between state practice or expectations and 
international court jurisprudence could be cited, including the conflict over the spreading 
jurisprudence of “death row syndrome,” see infra notes 221–231 and accompanying text, or 
conflicts over the legality of amnesties, see Binder, supra note 28, at 1204. Even the WTO 
Appellate Body’s discussion of precedent met some stiff resistance from state parties who 
believed that “this Appellate Body Report’s approach, including its references to a ‘coherent 
and predictable body of jurisprudence’, would appear to transform the WTO dispute settle-
ment system into a common law system,” something “nowhere agreed among Members.” 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 
20 May 2008, ¶ 53, WT/DSB/M/250 (July 1, 2008). 
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arbitrations against their host states. From a relative handful in the 
1980s, there are now more than 2500 such treaties197 between over 177 
states,198 and the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, just one body charged with investor-state arbitrations, 
has registered over three hundred cases.199 
As Anthea Roberts has wisely explained, despite its sudden familiarity, 
investment arbitration remains something of a puzzle.200 On the one hand, 
investment treaties are agreements between states governed by international 
law rules of interpretation. On the other hand, they create at least some 
rights in individual investors, and arbitrations are designed to allow inves-
tors to vindicate those rights against state parties. Complicating matters 
more, investor claims often involve review of the host state’s public policies 
and legal processes.201 Should these arbitrations best be seen as functions of 
international law, in which the state parties’ views should be paramount; 
analogs to commercial arbitration, in which arbitrators should strive for 
“equality of arms” between claimant investors and respondent states; or 
some form of public law review, with its appropriate deference to democrat-
ic decision making?202 
This conceptual puzzle became a doctrinal problem and a real-world 
conflict between negotiated-law and adjudicated-law models in the context 
of NAFTA. NAFTA, a regional trade and investment agreement between 
Canada, the United States, and Mexico, provides in Chapter 11 for investor-
initiated arbitrations against the three state parties. After a series of 
arbitrations203 interpreted the treaty in favor of the investors, adopting broad 
interpretations of Article 1105’s promise of “fair and equitable treatment” 
and “full protection and security,”204 Canada, the United States, and Mexico 
took joint action to declare their contrary understanding of the treaty 
provisions in question. NAFTA includes provisions for an FTC made up of 
representatives from the three states that can “resolve disputes that may 
                                                                                                                           
 197. Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct In-
vestment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 Va. J. Int’l L. 397, 401–02 (2011). 
 198. Alvarez, supra note 70, at 20–21. 
 199. Yackee, supra note 197, at 403. 
 200. See Roberts, supra note 183, at 19–22; Roberts, supra note 2, at 179. 
 201. See Roberts, supra note 183, at 19–20. 
 202. Id. at 18–20; see also Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Litera-
ture and Sociology of International Investment Law, 22 Eur. J. Int’l L. 875, 888 (2011). 
 203. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶¶ 110–113, 118 
(Apr. 10, 2001), 7 ICSID Rep. 102 (2005) (holding that fair and equitable treatment requires 
compliance with not only international law, but also with the “ordinary standards” of fairness 
“applied in the NAFTA countries”); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AB)/97/1, Award, ¶¶ 71, 76, 88 (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002) (holding 
that “fair and equitable treatment” includes transparency obligations similar to those in other 
chapters of NAFTA); Brower, S.D. Myers, supra note 2 (“[T]he breach of a rule of 
international law specifically designed to protect investors would ‘weigh heavily’ in favor of 
finding a violation of Article 1105(1).” (quoting S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, 
¶ 264 (Nov. 13, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408 (2001))). For discussion of the cases, see Brower, Why 
the FTC Notes of Interpretation Constitute a Partial Amendment of NAFTA Article 1105, 
supra note 2, at 352. 
 204. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105. 
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arise regarding [the treaty’s] interpretation or application” by adopting 
interpretations of the agreement binding on NAFTA tribunals.205 Acting 
under the FTC’s mandates, the three states issued “Notes of 
Interpretation,”206 which among other things made clear that Article 1105 
promised nothing more than the international minimum standard of 
protection.207 
Even in the absence of the FTC’s special authority, an agreement on in-
terpretation by the three state parties would have deserved special deference 
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which gives special 
weight to “subsequent agreements by the parties”208—a nod to international 
law’s negotiated-law model of gap filling. Nonetheless, at least one NAFTA 
arbitral tribunal chafed at the decisions. Communicating an implicit adher-
ence to an adjudicated-law model of their role, one panel questioned the 
FTC interpretation’s faithfulness to the “rule of international law that no-one 
shall be judge in his own cause” and arbitration’s goal of “assur[ing] due 
process before an impartial tribunal.”209 
In the end, NAFTA tribunals fell in line, but perhaps only because of the 
unique nature of the FTC and the unusually clear and formal joint agree-
ment between the three state parties.210 That situation is unlikely to repeat 
itself in the bilateral treaty context, mostly because most arbitrations pit one 
state’s (usually the developed one’s) investors against the other state (usually 
the less developed one). As a result, the commonality of interests necessary 
to produce an FTC-style renegotiation is rarely present. The conflict be-
tween visions is likely though to gurgle beneath the surface, as respondent 
states continue to bristle at “activist” decisions by arbitrators. Respondent 
states continue to ask tribunals to look to evidence of subsequent agreement 
or practice in interpreting vague provisions of the treaties; embracing an 
adjudicated-law model of their roles, arbitrators have often rejected these 
requests as too biased in favor of states.211 
The picture is changing as developed states increasingly find themselves 
responding to arbitration demands under these agreements, and perhaps the 
point will come where the parties can jointly revise their agreements.212 The 
                                                                                                                           
 205. Id. arts. 1131(2), 2001(1)–(2)(c). 
 206. NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, supra note 3. 
 207. Roland Kläger, “Fair and Equitable Treatment” in International In-
vestment Law 68–71 (2011); Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: 
International Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2029, 2143–44 (2004); Brower, 
Why the FTC Notes of Interpretation Constitute a Partial Amendment of NAFTA Article 1105, 
supra note 2, at 353–55. 
 208. VCLT, supra note 5, art. 31(3). 
 209. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages, ¶ 13.1 (May 31, 
2002), 41 I.L.M. 1347 (2002). 
 210. See Kläger, supra note 207, at 72–74; Brower, Why the FTC Notes of Interpreta-
tion Constitute a Partial Amendment of NAFTA Article 1105, supra note 2, at 355–56. 
 211. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 215–23 (summarizing these practices). As Roberts 
explains, the picture is actually quite hazy, with some tribunals accepting such evidence and 
some rejecting it. Id. 
 212. In one case, Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Bolivia, the government of the Netherlands 
indicated that it agreed with Bolivia’s interpretation of the Netherlands-Bolivia bilateral in-
vestment treaty (BIT). See Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, 
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United States’ new Model BIT, for example, seems to scale back investors’ 
rights, perhaps a response to developing jurisprudence.213 But given that 
questions have already been raised regarding the actual value of these BITs 
for developing states,214 dissenting states may simply seek to withdraw from 
them, as Bolivia,215 Ecuador,216 and Venezuela217 have, or to ignore the 
judgments, as Argentina has been accused of doing.218 
                                                                                                                           
Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 249 (Oct. 21, 2005), 20 ICSID Rev. 
450 (2005), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= 
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC629_En&caseId=C210. In another case, Pakistan 
complained that it had not been consulted before the tribunal interpreted a provision of its BIT 
with Switzerland in a case against that state. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance, S.A. v. 
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 
¶¶ 79–81 (Aug. 6, 2003), 18 ICSID Rev. 307, 331 (2003), available at https://icsid. 
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC
622_En&caseId=C205. For more on these cases, see Roberts, supra note 2, at 216–17, 220. 
 213. E.g., Wenhua Shan, From “North-South Divide” to “Public-Private Debate”: Re-
vival of the Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in International Investment Law, 27 
Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 631, 650–51 (2007). 
 214. E.g., U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Bilateral Investment Treaties in 
the Mid-1990s, at 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998); 
Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of 
(International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 Law & Soc’y Rev. 
805, 827–28 (2008) (finding little impact on foreign direct investment); Mary Hallward-
Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a Bit . . . 
and They Could Bite 18–23 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 3121, 2003), available at http://tinyurl.com/3akk3af (finding little correlation between 
BITs and foreign direct investment). But see Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do 
BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 
46 Harv. Int’l L.J. 67, 111 (2005) (finding some positive impact on foreign direct invest-
ment). 
 215. News Release, Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], Bolivia Submits a 
Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (May 16, 2007), http://icsid. 
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType
=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement3; see also 
Kate M. Supnik, Note, Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile Com-
peting Interests in International Investment Law, 59 Duke L.J. 343, 355–57 (2009) 
(describing Bolivia’s withdrawal). 
 216. News Release, ICSID, Ecuador Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID 
Convention (July 9, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= 
CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=News 
Releases&pageName=Announcement20. 
 217. Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Venezuela Withdraws from ICSID, at 1 (Jan. 27, 2012), 
http://www.sullcrom.com/files/Publication/36d01dac-d00c-4b4e-99ba-5cddb9a36435/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c22652b9-2993-461d-97c2-63a5707ed34a/SC_ 
Publication_Venezuela_Withdraws_From_ICSID.pdf. 
 218. Argentina’s Oil Industry: Feed Me, Seymour, Economist (Apr. 16, 2012, 11:16 
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2012/04/argentinas-oil-industry. See 
generally Charity L. Goodman, Comment, Uncharted Waters: Financial Crisis and Enforce-
ment of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 449 (2007) (discussing 
Argentina’s history regarding these conventions). 
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2. Diplomatic Assurances 
The ECHR is famous for its effectiveness.219 Its reputation for compli-
ance is so strong that in some studies of compliance and international law, it 
is treated as an outlier, best left out of consideration.220 If any international 
tribunal has the authority to fill the gaps in state obligations, certainly it 
would be the ECHR. It is thus all the more notable when European states 
assert that it is their prerogative, not the court’s, to develop the uncertain 
areas of law through state practice. 
The conflict over who should develop the gaps in European human 
rights law has come to a head over the question of extradition, transfer, and 
removal. In an initial episode that pitted judicial interpretation against state 
prerogatives, the ECHR held in Soering v. United Kingdom221 that under the 
European Convention’s prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment,222 member states were barred from transferring 
individuals to states where such treatment might occur.223 Although mem-
bers chafed at the decision from the beginning,224 this jurisprudence became 
newly relevant and problematic with European counterterrorism efforts fol-
lowing the September 11th attacks on the United States. Finding suspected 
foreign terrorists in their midst, but lacking the evidence of a crime neces-
sary for domestic prosecution, European states sought to return them to their 
states of origin, some of which were interested in prosecuting the alleged 
                                                                                                                           
 219. E.g., Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights 23–24 (1990) (noting the “dramatic suc-
cesses” of the ECHR); Aeyal M. Gross, Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the 
Emperor’s New Clothes of the International Law of Occupation?, 18 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1, 29 
(2007) (“The high level of compliance with the [European Court of Human Right’s] jurispru-
dence is an exception.”); Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency: 
Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 Mich. J. Int’l L. 311, 315 n.16 
(2001) (“The exception here is the European Court of Human Rights, which has established a 
remarkable record of compliance.”). 
 220. See Alter, supra note 154, at 27 (“[T]he empirical analysis reveals that the [Euro-
pean Court of Justice] and the ECHR are outliers.”); Christopher J. Borgen, Triptych: 
Sectarian Disputes, International Law, and Transnational Tribunals in Drinan’s Can God 
and Caesar Coexist?, 45 J. Cath. Legal Stud. 11, 43 (2006) (“While the ECHR and the 
[Inter-American Court of Human Rights] have certain strengths relative to the United Na-
tions system, the European experience is still an outlier point. Furthermore, while the 
ECHR is perhaps the most successful of human rights tribunals, it is not a helpful analogy 
when designing a global tribunal on religious rights.”). 
 221. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5 (1989). 
 222. European Convention on Human Rights art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 223. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 5. 
 224. This decision actually produced an earlier standoff between courts and states. In 
this same decision, the ECHR found extended stays on death row violative of the Convention’s 
prohibition on cruel or degrading treatment. Id. at 5–6. Much in the style of common law 
jurisprudence, other courts began adopting the interpretation for other similar provisions. As 
recounted by Larry Helfer, however, the eventual application of the rule to the Jamaican Con-
stitution by the British Privy Council created a backlash across Caribbean death-penalty states 
that led to their eventual withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the Privy Council, the Human 
Rights Committee, and the Inter-American Court. See Helfer, supra note 32, at 1910. The 
story suggests an implicit view by some that the ambiguity regarding the death penalty’s status 
under international law should be resolved by state practice, not judicial reasoning. 
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terrorists for crimes committed there.225 Many of these potential receiving 
states, however, had less than glowing human rights records or criminal jus-
tice systems, and legitimate questions could be raised about the treatment 
suspected terrorists would receive upon their return, particularly as those 
suspects might be members of groups warring against the receiving states as 
well.226 After Soering was extended to deportation of non-national security 
risks in Chahal v. United Kingdom,227 European states sought assurances 
from receiving states regarding the proper treatment of transferees upon 
their arrival lest they run afoul of their Convention obligations as interpreted 
by the ECHR.228 
In a series of cases starting with Saadi v. Italy in 2008,229 the ECHR has 
taken an increasingly restrictive stance with regard to these assurances. 
Although not ruling out that some form of assurance might comport with 
member states’ obligations with regard to torture, the court has asserted its 
authority to review such assurances for itself and has suggested that such 
assurances will rarely, if ever, be reliable when the country in question has a 
poor human rights record.230 In a recent 2012 decision, the ECHR ruled 
against the United Kingdom in its attempt to transfer Abu Qatada, an alleged 
top Al Qaeda official, to Jordan because he could not be guaranteed a fair 
trial there.231 
                                                                                                                           
 225. See, e.g., Gasayev c. Espagne, App. No. 48514/06, at *2 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-91735 (applicant wanted for trial 
in Russia); Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06, ¶¶ 9–94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-85276 (applicant wanted for trial 
in Tunisia); U.N. HRC, Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, 
of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005, Annex (Nov. 10, 2006) (applicant indicted in Egypt); U.N. Comm. 
Against Torture, Decision of the Committee Against Torture Under Article 22 of the Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
¶¶ 2.1–.4, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, Annex (May 24, 2005). 
 226. See sources cited supra note 225. 
 227. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, ¶¶ 72–107. 
 228. Among states seeking assurances are the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Russia, and Sweden. See generally Human Rights Watch, Still at Risk: Diplomatic As-
surances No Safeguard Against Torture 3–4 (2005) (describing state practice); Alice 
Izumo, Note, Diplomatic Assurances Against Torture and Ill Treatment: European Court of 
Human Rights Jurisprudence, 42 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 233 (2010) (same). 
 229. Saadi, App. No. 37201/06, ¶¶ 148–149. 
 230. See Izumo, supra note 228, at 233. Notably, as Izumo points out, although rejecting 
transfers to Tunisia, Jordan, India, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Belarus, the 
ECHR has approved transfers to the United States on a number of occasions. Ahmad v. United 
Kingdom, App. Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09, 67354/09, at *81 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110267; Boumediene 
v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1612, ¶¶ 67–68; Al-Moayad v. Germany, App. 
No. 35865/03, ¶¶ 103–108 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/ 
pages/search.aspx?i=001-79710; see also Izumo, supra note 228, at 272 (noting the ECHR’s 
reliance on a “good-faith presumption arising out of the U.S. human rights record [and] the 
specificity of the assurances and the lack of evidence that the U.S. had ever breached its assur-
ances in the past”).  
 231. Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, App. No. No. 8139/09, at *91 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-108629. 
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These decisions are particularly notable because they came at the same 
time European states were collecting relevant state practice on the issue.232 
From 2005 to 2006, the Group of Specialists on Human Rights and the Fight 
Against Terrorism, a group of government representatives created by the 
Council of Europe’s Steering Committee for Human Rights, studied “issues 
raised with regard to human rights by the use of diplomatic assurances in the 
context of expulsion procedures.”233 The goal was to “consider the appropri-
ateness of a legal instrument, for example a recommendation on minimum 
requirements/standards of such diplomatic assurances, and, if need be, pre-
sent concrete proposals.”234 Central to the study was a questionnaire that 
sought state practice on assurances.235 It quickly became clear that states had 
very different positions, some using assurances, some seeking to limit them, 
and some rejecting them outright as perversions of the absolute prohibition 
against torture.236 Ultimately, the Group of Specialists suggested against a 
new legal instrument, noting among other reasons that “it would be particu-
larly difficult to draft such an instrument as member states had no common 
position on the use of diplomatic assurances.”237 
These divergent positions appear to have survived the ECHR’s deci-
sions, as a number of European states have continued their practice of 
collecting assurances.238 Given the ECHR’s failure to adopt a categorical 
ban, these states may not technically be in noncompliance. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that they do not agree with the strongest implications of the ECHR’s 
jurisprudence. Multiple states have continued to seek and use assurances to 
transfer individuals to other countries, and the United Kingdom is coming 
under increasing domestic pressure to withdraw from the court’s jurisdic-
tion,239 something that would undoubtedly precipitate a crisis of legitimacy 
                                                                                                                           
 232. These ECHR decisions are also of note because they depart from the ECHR’s usual 
sensitivity to evolving state practice through the application of “margins of appreciation,” 
which grant greater deference to state decision making when no common European standard 
has emerged but less when one has. Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and 
the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human 
Rights, 15 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 391, 450–66 (2001). Unlike other provisions of the Conven-
tion, Article 3 is nonderogable, and as such the ECHR has decided the rule is absolute and that 
no margin of appreciation applies. See infra notes 326–333 and accompanying text. 
 233. Izumo, supra note 228, at 250–51 (internal citation omitted). 
 234. Id. at 251 (internal citation omitted). 
 235. Id. 
 236. See Rep. of the Group of Specialists on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terror-
ism, 2d Meeting, Mar. 29–31, 2006, app. III, ¶¶ 12–16, Doc. No. DH-S-TER(2006)005 (Apr. 
3, 2006), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/DH_S_TER/ 
2006_005_en.pdf. 
 237. Id. app. III, ¶ 17(ii). 
 238. Izumo, supra note 228, at 274–76. See generally Amnesty Int’l, Dangerous 
Deals: Europe’s Reliance on “Diplomatic Assurances” Against Torture 13–14, 18–31 
(2010), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR01/012/2010/en/608f128b-
9eac-4e2f-b73b-6d747a8cbaed/eur010122010en.pdf (summarizing cases). 
 239. E.g., James Landale, David Cameron Plays for Time on European Human Rights, 
BBC News (Jan. 25, 2012, 3:34 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16712705; Paul 
Vale, European Convention of Human Rights: Cameron Under Pressure to Withdraw Britain 
from Treaty, Huffington Post U.K. (Jan. 22, 2012, 5:01 PM), http:// 
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for the previously effective court. U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron has 
attacked the court’s legitimacy over the decisions, proposing amendments to 
the court’s rules that might require greater deference to national decision 
making.240 And he is clearly not alone among European leaders, as the 
Council of Europe unanimously adopted most of his reforms in April 
2012.241 Touting the Brighton Declaration’s reforms and highlighting the 
philosophic differences between states and the ECHR, U.K. Attorney Gen-
eral Dominic Grieve explained: 
This Declaration makes clear that the primary responsibility for 
guaranteeing human rights rests with the government, parliament 
and courts of a country. It sets out clearly that the Court should not 
routinely overturn the decisions made by national authorities—and 
it should respect different solutions and different approaches be-
tween states as being legitimate.242 
In the language of this Article, for Grieve, the question of diplomatic assur-
ances is a matter for negotiated law. Any gaps in the European Convention 
on the appropriateness of assurances are for the states, rather than the court, 
to work out among themselves. Whether this vision or that of the ECHR will 
prevail remains an open question. 
3. Defending Oneself from Nonstate Actors 
The news abounds with stories of the threats of nonstate actors: Al 
Shabab in Somalia, the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, the FARC in Columbia. Increasingly, these 
groups are accused of leaving their safe havens in one country to plot 
attacks on others: Al Shabab against Kenya,243 the Taliban and Al Qaeda 
against the United States,244 the FARC from Ecuador into Colombia.245 
When, if ever, are targeted states permitted to use force against these groups 
in their home or host territory? Although Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter 
requires all member states to “refrain in their international relations from the 
                                                                                                                           
www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/01/22/european-convention-of-human-rights-david-cameron-
under-pressure-to-withdraw-britain-from-treaty_n_1222086.html. 
 240. E.g., Helen Warrell, Clarke Hails ECHR Reform but Critics Unconvinced, Fin. 
Times (Apr. 19, 2012, 8:31 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/99a30bb4-8a4a-11e1-93c9-
00144feab49a.html. 
 241. Brighton Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Apr. 
19–20, 2012, Brighton Declaration, ¶ 15, http://hub.coe.int/20120419-brighton-declaration; 
see also Q&A: Reforming European Court of Human Rights, BBC News (Apr. 23, 2012, 
11:07 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17748313. 
 242. Press Release, U.K. Ministry of Justice, UK Delivers European Court Reform (Apr. 
20, 2012), http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/press-releases/moj/uk-delivers-european-court-
reform. 
 243. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, At Least 15 Die in Kenya Church Attacks, N.Y. Times, 
July 2, 2012, at A4. 
 244. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Christmas Day Bomb Plot Detailed in Court Filings, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 11, 2012, at A15. 
 245. See, e.g., Stephan Küffner, Ecuador Officials Linked to Colombia Rebels, Time 
World (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1948040,00.html. 
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threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state,”246 Article 51 preserves states’ “inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against” 
them.247 Does an attack by a nonstate actor implicate a state’s right to self-
defense? Does that right allow targeted states to violate other states’ 
sovereignty, otherwise protected by Article 2(4), to counter the threat? If so, 
under what conditions? 
A number of scholars have begun to collect state practice surrounding 
the issue. Although they quantify the level of consensus differently, many 
seem to agree that a common standard is emerging: when a nonstate actor’s 
actions against a state rise to the level of “an armed attack,” a targeted state’s 
right to self-defense attaches, and where the host state is “unwilling or una-
ble” to prevent the threat, the targeted state may use force within the host 
state’s borders to counter the nonstate actor.248 Of course, many questions 
remain at the margins: among others, how much weight to give to the prac-
tices of some states rather than others, what kind of threat or attack by a 
nonstate actor would amount to an “armed attack,” what constitutes an un-
willingness or inability by a state to act, whether any procedural rules 
should attach to the determination.249 
Even with some consensus surrounding the evidence, though, the mean-
ing of this state practice remains controversial. For some, the emerging 
practice is not a real-time negotiation of a gap in international law with re-
gard to nonstate actors, but an attempt to overrule prior doctrine and 
understandings. These scholars point to the ICJ’s opinions in the Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,250 Legal Consequenc-
es of Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory (Israeli 
Wall),251 and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) v. Uganda252 cases as 
                                                                                                                           
 246. U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 
 247. Id. art. 51.  
 248. E.g., Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for 
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Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11, 
105 Am. J. Int’l L. 244, 244 (2011); Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 
20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 359, 378–81 (2010). Tom Ruys exemplifies that this is a matter of quanti-
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the only thing that can be said about proportionate trans-border measures of self-defence 
against attacks by non-State actors in cases falling below the Nicaragua threshold is that they 
are ‘not unambiguously illegal.’ ” Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN 
Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice 531 (2010). 
 249. E.g., Deeks, supra note 248, at 483; Ratner, supra note 248. 
 250. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 205 (June 27). 
 251. Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 184 (July 9). 
 252. Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 
2005 I.C.J. 168, 215 (Dec. 19). 
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proof of a different rule. In each case, the court at least implied that self-
defense is only possible against a state and that reprisals against nonstate 
actors in a foreign state are lawful only when the nonstate actors’ actions are 
attributable to that state.253 The court in the Nicaragua case, faced with the 
question whether a nonstate group’s actions could be an “armed attack” 
triggering self-defense, focused on whether the nonstate actor’s actions 
could be attributed to a state, developing a test of “effective control.”254 In 
the Israeli Wall advisory opinion, the court held that Israel could not invoke 
self-defense because Israel did not allege that the acts were imputable to a 
foreign state and “Article 51 of the Charter . . . recognizes the existence of 
an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State 
against another State.”255 And in the DRC v. Uganda opinion, despite declin-
ing to address “whether and under what conditions contemporary 
international law provides for a right of self-defence against large-scale at-
tacks by irregular forces,” the court held that the attacks in question did not 
trigger Uganda’s right to self-defense because they were “non-attributable to 
the DRC.”256 
Again the conflict seems clear: Is international law in this area a function 
of negotiated law or adjudicated law? Are states filling a gap in the law of 
armed conflict through common practice as many states and observers sug-
gest,257 or are they seeking to overrule a rule articulated in one of international 
law’s most solemn documents (the U.N. Charter) and elaborated by its most 
esteemed court (the ICJ)? Everything seems to turn on one’s baseline under-
standing of how international law is meant to work.258 
In the United States, it was the divergence between federal common law 
and state common law259 rules that forced the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins to recognize that there was, in fact, no general common law 
to draw from and that they, the judges, were the ones actually producing those 
rules.260 The divergence between the jurisprudence of international courts and 
                                                                                                                           
 253. E.g., Ruys, supra note 248, at 475–76; Kevin Jon Heller, The Law of Neutrality 
Does Not Apply to the Conflict with Al-Qaeda, and It’s a Good Thing, Too: A Response to 
Chang, 47 Tex. Int’l L.J. 115, 140 (2011); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Remarks: The Resort to 
Drones Under International Law, 39 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 585, 594–95 (2011) (“Thus, 
although this notion is often heard, there is no actual right to use military force triggered by a 
state unwilling or unable to control such groups.”). 
 254. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 64–65, 103–04.  
 255. Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. at 194. 
 256. Territory of Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 222–23. 
 257. E.g., Deeks, supra note 248, at 483; Ratner, supra note 248. 
 258. E.g., Ruys, supra note 248, at 530–31. 
 259. E.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 (1938) (noting the criticism pro-
duced by Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 
276 U.S. 518 (1928), and how the Court in that case tacitly accepted the applicants’ blatant 
forum shopping for federal rather than Kentucky common law). 
 260. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. The basic question before the U.S. Supreme Court in Erie was 
whether federal courts should decide cases between citizens of two states on the basis of fed-
eral or state common law doctrines. Id. at 71. Although the U.S. Constitution does not give the 
federal government general legislative authority over issues like contract or tort, prior deci-
sions had held that federal courts should apply federal common law. Id. at 71–72. These 
decisions were based, at least in part, on the notion that the common law existed external to 
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state practice should be a similar source of soul searching.261 International 
courts can no longer hide behind a “transcendental body of”262 state-
produced custom to deny responsibility for the rules they expound. As 
Justice Holmes explained, “law in the sense in which courts speak of it 
today does not exist without some definite authority behind it.”263 Once the 
curtain of custom has been lifted, how will international judges justify their 
authority? 
III. Translations 
Has international law reached its Erie moment? Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins was a response to the conflicting claims to regulate an increasing-
ly complex world of interconnected interstate activity.264 It “sought to adapt 
the architecture of American government to the challenges of a new, ex-
panding, and dynamic interstate society”265 by forging a new, modern 
jurisprudence. With its twenty-first-century regulations of an increasingly 
globalized world putting pressure on its early twentieth-century jurispru-
dence, international law now finds itself at a similar crossroads. And 
whether or not it’s recognized as such, much like the federal courts of the 
early twentieth century, international law has reached a legitimacy crisis. 
The rapid judicialization of international law over the last fifty years has left 
us with two rival pictures of international law—one ruled by states, in which 
their actions and reactions shape the law, and a second ruling over states, in 
which an increasingly dense group of courts, tribunals, and expert bodies 
develops and elaborates the law’s gaps away. Both have some claims to le-
gitimacy: states can point to international law doctrine’s continued reliance 
on state practice and state consent, international judges to the increased reli-
ance on their good offices for dispute resolution. But both also find their 
legitimacy questioned: states shouldn’t be allowed to act as judge and jury 
                                                                                                                           
any state and was simply “discovered” by whatever court construed the rule. Id. at 79. By this 
account, federal courts were equally placed to construe common law doctrines for themselves. 
Id. at 73. Erie rejected that position, holding that there is no general common law and that the 
common law was state law, based on state legislative authority. Id. at 79–80. 
 261. Making the analogy even stronger, although Erie is often framed in terms of state 
versus federal courts, Erie may have in fact reflected a battle between the courts and legisla-
tures. As Edward Purcell explains, conservative federal jurists had used the general common 
law to limit the reforms enacted by progressive-era state legislatures. See Edward A. Pur-
cell, Jr., Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution 12–13 (2000). By denying the 
federal courts that jurisdiction, Justice Brandeis gave those legislatures considerably more 
room and authority. Id. at 299–305. 
 262. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. at 
533 (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 263. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 264. “Developments in communications and transportation during the nineteenth century 
and the establishment of a national market following the Civil War multiplied the number and 
variety of interstate activities.” Purcell, supra note 261, at 182. Erie “was grounded in . . . 
Brandeis’s practical understanding of the structural and operational requirements of American 
constitutional federalism in an age of burgeoning multistate activities.” Id.  
 265. Id. at 185. 
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in their own cause;266 international judges have usurped authority that was 
never given to them.267 And with no single picture of international law able 
to win the day, all of international law looks more questionable. 
But how can we move forward and put international law on firmer 
ground? Although this Article’s primary purpose is to illuminate the prob-
lems of translation created by international law’s increasing judicialization, 
it can suggest some steps forward. Questions similar to those raised in this 
Article have arisen in other forms, whether in discussions of lex lata ver-
sus lex ferenda (law as it is versus law as it should be)268 or non liquet 
(whether international law has gaps in its coverage or is a complete sys-
tem).269 Recognizing, however, that there may actually be two different 
types of law—negotiated law and adjudicated law—competing for pre-
dominance within the international system suggests that the choice is not 
one between two different interpretations of the law (should a more con-
servative or more progressive approach be adopted),270 but rather one 
between different sources entirely. Moving forward seems to require both a 
clearer understanding of the types of nontreaty law that may be in play and 
the reasons why various actors might or might not be in a position to apply 
them. 
This requires two key steps. First, we must ask the difficult question of 
what the potential sources of nontreaty international law actually are. Is cus-
tom the primary source of these rules, or are there other nontreaty sources of 
law in use? Second, we must ask the even more difficult question of what role 
these various sources should play in the international system. Who in the in-
ternational system should have the authority to use or elaborate different types 
of rules? If, for example, forms of international common law seem to play a 
role in international law, which bodies have the authority to use them and 
when? More importantly, what should be the relationship between these vari-
ous sources? In a conflict between custom and common law, which should 
prevail? Are there any techniques available to mediate conflicting claims? 
This Part will take each step in turn and suggest some initial answers. 
                                                                                                                           
 266. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages, ¶ 13.1 (May 31, 
2002), 41 I.L.M. 1347. 
 267. WTO Dispute Settlement Body, supra note 196, ¶ 53 (recording the United States’ 
objection that “this Appellate Body Report’s approach, including its references to a ‘coherent 
and predictable body of jurisprudence’, would appear to transform the WTO dispute settle-
ment system into a common law system,” something “nowhere agreed among Members”). 
 268. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 Am. J. Int’l L. 146 
(1987); Roberts, supra note 21, at 763, 773–78; John Tasioulas, In Defence of Relative Nor-
mativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case, 16 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 85, 85 
(1996).  
 269. E.g., Daniel Bodansky, Non Liquet and the Incompleteness of International Law, in 
International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons 153 
(Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999). 
 270. This would track choices between lex lata and lex ferenda or between gap-filled or 
gapless views regarding non liquet. 
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A. Cataloging Nontreaty Law 
Better identifying what a rule is allows us to better identify its sources 
of authority. Identifying the rule’s sources of authority, in turn, allows us to 
develop more precise accounts of its legitimacy or illegitimacy. If the rule 
we are talking about is a rule of “true” custom, its sources of authority can 
be found in state practice, and its legitimacy will be tested against traditional 
concerns regarding that process: Is it coherent enough to suggest an actual 
rule, does the rule seem to be the result of practical experience, and is the 
practice widespread and well known enough to suggest some form of con-
sent or acquiescence by others? If, on the other hand, what we are talking 
about is a form of common law,271 its authority must emanate from the judg-
es who expound it, and its legitimacy will be a function of a court’s 
perceived authority, neutrality, and reasoning. This, of course, was the les-
son in the United States of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins: common law 
case-by-case elaboration is lawmaking, and the courts that exercise it must 
justify their authority.272 
What follows is a very preliminary list of nontreaty sources we might 
identify. 
1. Custom 
Most nontreaty law in international law is currently categorized as cus-
tom. The reasons for this are largely doctrinal. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute’s 
list of sources has generally been treated as an authoritative list of the sources 
of international law, and that list provides only two possible sources of non-
treaty law—custom and general principles of law.273 Although some nontreaty 
rules, like estoppel or statutes of limitation, have been described by scholars 
and courts as general principles, custom has been the principal claimed source 
of nontreaty rules. But while the process of trying to find nontreaty rules in 
the practice of states may once have provided a reasonable picture of interna-
tional law’s rules, and may have been useful in disciplining claims that new 
rules had been discovered, it now obscures far more than it reveals. 
Custom is the paradigmatic negotiated law. It is developed through 
states’ interactions with one another over time. As the traditional definition 
explains, customary international law emerges from the practices of states 
followed out of a sense of legal obligation.274 “A signal feature of custom 
                                                                                                                           
 271. I use this term loosely to refer to processes of reasoned elaboration broader than the 
Anglo-American model. I do realize, however, that this sets me up, rightly, for criticisms that 
the Article suffers from an Anglo-American bias. Cf. Howse, supra note 27, at 223 (recounting 
a common-law-prejudiced view of the prerequisites for an effective legal system, including 
that it evolve incrementally over time). 
 272. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (“[L]aw in the sense in which 
courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it.” (quoting 
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see Purcell, supra note 261, at 190 (“For Brandeis, the Swift 
doctrine [which Erie overturned] ultimately posed an issue not of philosophy or even of feder-
alism but of political accountability and constitutional balance.”). 
 273. ICJ Statute, supra note 4, art. 38(1). 
 274. Gerald J. Postema, Custom in International Law: A Normative Practice Account, 
in The Nature of Customary Law, supra note 39, at 279, 285 (“Customs are primarily 
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[then] is that it is a practiced norm”275 within the community of states.276 As 
has long been recognized,277 however, many purported nontreaty rules in 
international law cannot meet this definition. This does not mean that they 
are not international law.278 There are other options. 
2. General Principles of Law 
The traditional list of international law’s sources embodied in Article 38 
does include another nontreaty source: “the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations.”279 For better or worse, this source has received 
less attention than treaties and custom. Part of the reason for this source’s 
general neglect may be uncertainty over exactly what it means. Is the refer-
ence to “general principles common to the major systems of the world,”280 
general principles of international law,281 or to principles inherent in the 
concept of law—perhaps a feature of law’s internal morality?282 Each of 
these types of rules would be in its own way difficult to find. As David 
Bederman writes, for example, 
In order for an international lawyer to argue that a general principle 
of law is a binding rule of international law, it would be necessary 
to canvass all of the world’s great legal systems for evidence of that 
principle, and also to reference manifestations of that principle in 
                                                                                                                           
concerned with (social) behavior, but they are not (merely) patterns of behavior; rather they 
set standards for behavior, standards of correct and incorrect behavior, and thus purport to 
guide that behavior and provide bases for its assessment.”). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Although not entirely relevant to the discussion here of negotiated versus adjudicat-
ed law, there may be additional forms of nonstate community custom in international law as 
well. We might expect that communities of professionals working together closely on issues—
for example, in investment arbitration—may develop their own authoritative practices con-
cerning the acceptable interpretations of international law. Cohen, Finding International Law 
II, supra note 164, at 1084, 1089–90. This custom would thus be akin to the sorts of “com-
mercial practices” recognized by the Uniform Commercial Code in the United States. U.C.C. 
§ 1-103(a)(2) (2005). 
 277. Roberts, supra note 2, at 206, 214–15.  
 278. See e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 Mich. J. 
Int’l L. 115, 141–49 (2005); cf. Cohen, Finding International Law I, supra note 164, at 70–
71 (suggesting that it is opinio juris and not state practice that determines whether a rule is 
treated as international law). 
 279. ICJ Statute, supra note 4, art. 38(1)(c). 
 280. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102(1)(c) (1987) (defining 
sources of international law); see also David J. Bederman, International Law Frame-
works 13–14 (3d ed. 2010) (adopting this view). 
 281. See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 92–99 (5th ed. 2003) (“It is not 
clear, however, in all cases, whether what is involved is a general principle of law appearing in 
municipal systems or a general principle of international law.”). 
 282. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 153 (rev. ed. 1969); cf. Jutta Brunnée 
& Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional 
Theory of International Law, 39 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 19, 55–56 (2000) (distinguishing 
rules of law based on the internal rationality of the law). 
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the actual domestic law of as many nations as possible. This is no 
easy task.283 
It is further unclear whether general principles are themselves a source of 
international law or merely a source of supplementary rules that can fill gaps 
where necessary to resolve a specific dispute.284 It is perhaps not surprising 
that few such “general principles” have been found. 
The source may nonetheless have great value in explaining some of the 
nontreaty rules currently referenced. Bederman suggests that pacta sunt 
servanda, the obligation to follow one’s agreements that undergirds much of 
international law, is a general principle.285 Philip Alston and Bruno Simma 
have argued that fundamental human rights law may be better understood as 
deriving from general principles than from custom,286 a recharacterization 
that would sidestep some of the thornier questions about the meaning of 
state practice in the area. 
What is key, though, is that anchoring the legitimacy of a general prin-
ciple will again depend on exactly what it is we’re talking about. The 
authority of a general principle common to national legal systems would 
essentially be derivative, borrowing legitimacy from the legal systems that 
recognize it. A general principle of “international law” would likely require 
some concept of tacit or community consent. A general principle of “law” 
would require some explanation of its basis in a concept of law. If general 
principles of one of the three types listed above are actual sources being 
referenced by courts, tribunals, or other bodies, they should be properly jus-
tified as such. 
3. General Discursive Principles of International Law 
Dan Bodansky has noted that there is a range of purported rules of cus-
tom, like the precautionary principle, that are too abstract to really be 
described as custom but that are clearly principles of international, rather 
than municipal, law.287 These principles are often too abstract to be followed 
or not followed—respect for human dignity might be a similar type of prin-
ciple in human rights law. Instead their role is more as interpretative 
principles. They frame and guide arguments over international law’s more 
specific rules, much in the way concepts like separation of powers or feder-
alism do in the U.S. constitutional context. Their authority seems to derive 
from the extent to which they’re actually invoked by the various actors jock-
eying for position over international law’s rules. 
                                                                                                                           
 283. Bederman, supra note 280, at 13. 
 284. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102(4) (1987) (referring to 
general principles “as supplementary rules of international law where appropriate”). 
 285. Bederman, supra note 280, at 15. 
 286. Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus 
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 Austl. Y.B. Int’l L. 82, 102–06 (1988). 
 287. Daniel Bodansky, Prologue to a Theory of Non-treaty Norms, in Looking to the 
Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman 119, 127–28 
(Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011). 
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4. International Common Law 
Many of today’s purported rules of nontreaty international law seem to 
be emerging not from the customary practice of states, but instead from the 
jurisprudence of an ever-thickening network of international courts, 
tribunals, and expert bodies. As the adjudicatory-law model suggests, 
adjudication requires the elaboration of rules in a way negotiated law does 
not. When adjudication outpaces actual state practice, courts are much more 
likely to cite each other than the actual practice of states in finding those 
rules. 
There are actually a few different versions of international common law 
we might expect to find. The first is a type of procedural common law.288 
These are rules developed and borrowed by international bodies to fill the 
gaps in their own procedural mandates—how to hear and conduct cases, 
how to weigh evidence. While not entirely without controversy,289 these 
rules are generally the least problematic because they seem reasonably 
within the authority of courts to establish, at least in the face of silence in 
their constituting documents, and are easily contained within the 
adjudicatory context and a particular body (though perhaps not between 
them). A second type, which may at times overlap with the first, is regime-
specific common law. International criminal law provides numerous 
examples here of rules about mens rea or accessorial liability that must be 
developed to determine guilt or innocence but that simply will not be found 
in the practice of states.290 International criminal law also faces 
interpretative concerns absent from other areas of international law, like the 
legality principle and rule of lenity. These concerns suggest that 
international criminal tribunals should have different, or at least narrower, 
rules regarding prohibited conduct than international law more broadly.291 It 
should thus be no surprise that international criminal tribunals are often left 
parsing the practices of the Nuremberg and other tribunals rather than state 
practice itself.292 Finally, there might be a more general international 
                                                                                                                           
 288. See, e.g., Chester Brown, A Common Law of International Adjudication 
38–39 (2009) (detailing how international courts borrow rules of procedure from a variety of 
nonformal sources). 
 289. See, e.g., Patrick Robinson, Address, The Interaction of Legal Systems in the Work 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 16 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. 
L. 5, 13–14 (2009) (describing the ICTY’s “controversial procedure of judicial notice of adju-
dicated facts”); Daniel Tilley, The Non-rules of Evidence in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 45 Int’l L. 
695, 696–70 (2011) (describing controversial evidentiary rulings of the ICTY and Internation-
al Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda). 
 290. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 1080–83. 
 291. This type of regime-specific common law might also best describe the rules adopted 
by domestic courts interpreting international law in furtherance of a domestic statute. The 
resulting jurisprudence may present hybrid domestic-international rules keyed to the specific 
statutory context that might not perfectly reflect general international law. See Roberts, supra 
note 184, at 73–81. U.S. doctrine regarding the Alien Tort Statute may be a particularly good 
example. Id. at 76–78. The “specific, universal, and obligatory” test developed for ascertaining 
actionable violations of international law, for example, is derived from domestic legal sources 
with an eye toward domestic legal concerns rather than international law itself. See Wuerth, 
supra note 33, at 1941–43. 
 292. See Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 1075. 
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common law. These are rules adopted by particular tribunals with an eye 
toward elaborating or influencing international law more broadly. They are 
likely to be the most controversial as they insert themselves directly into the 
process of gap filling normally inhabited by states. The clearest examples 
are the rules adopted in decisions of the ICJ, but other bodies, like 
investment tribunals or the HRC established under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, have been known to opine on 
general international law.293 
What is key here is that recognizing the rules’ status as common law fo-
cuses our inquiries regarding the legitimacy of those rules more directly on 
the courts that develop them. Currently, courts can obscure these questions 
by invoking custom; it is states, they imply, who have made these rules, not 
they. But just as Erie punctured the myth of a legal ether in which the law 
floated, waiting to be discovered, so too must we put aside the myth that 
custom answers all. And with the obscuring curtain of custom now pulled 
aside, international judges, like U.S. federal judges before them, will now be 
forced to more precisely justify their own authority, whether by claiming the 
mantle of agent or trustee, invoking their neutrality, or articulating persua-
sive reasoning. 
Moreover, shifting this focus reframes questions about how the rules 
developed in one tribunal should be used in others. To the extent that courts 
are interpreting custom, it would be reasonable for other courts inside and 
outside a specific regime to borrow their interpretations (even if not treating 
them as authoritative or precedential).294 All of these courts are involved in a 
common endeavor and looking at common evidence. But if what courts are 
instead doing is common law lawmaking, then courts should be much more 
discerning in borrowing rules. The authority of common law rules derives 
from a particular court and its particular context, neither of which may be 
transferable. Instead, a court looking at a rule developed by another must 
first ask how persuasive that court’s solution was to a supposedly common 
problem and then independently justify its own decision to adopt a similar 
path.295 
                                                                                                                           
 293. See, e.g., U.N. HRC, General Comment 29: Article 4: Derogations During a State 
of Emergency, ¶ 13(a)–(b), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) (describing the right 
to be “treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person” 
and “prohibitions against taking of hostages, abductions or unacknowledged detention” as 
nonderogable as a matter of general international law); U.N. HRC, General Comment No. 
26(61), supra note 165, ¶ 1 (looking to general international law to determine “possibility of 
termination, denunciation or withdrawal”); Anastasios Gourgourinis, General/Particular In-
ternational Law and Primary/Secondary Rules: Unitary Terminology of a Fragmented System, 
22 Eur. J. Int’l L. 993, 1006–07 (2011) (describing references to general international law 
by investment tribunals). 
 294. See ICJ Statute, supra note 4, art. 38. 
 295. This might change, for example, how U.S. courts ascertain standards of liability in 
Alien Tort Statute actions. Entertaining claims for torts “committed in violation of the law of 
nations” requires standards for aiding and abetting liability and for corporate or individual 
liability. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011). Attempting to parse often-contradictory decisions of inter-
national criminal tribunals from Nuremberg to the ICTY, U.S. courts have struggled to figure 
out whether customary international law supplies such a standard and, if it does, what it might 
be. Compare Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), with Presbyterian Church 
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); compare Kiobel v. Royal 
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B. States or Courts? 
1. Beyond Delegation 
So far, we have talked about international courts and tribunals without 
any specification or differentiation. In fact, though, the list of quasi-
adjudicative bodies in international law varies widely. They differ in their 
constitution, their mandates, their permanence, and the bindingness of their 
decisions. Which of these bodies should hew closely to state practice and 
eschew precedent and which might reasonably claim rights to develop a 
fuller, more far-reaching jurisprudence is a very difficult question. 
The obvious corollary to the quest for precision in sources might be a 
quest for precision in court mandates. States should be clearer about what 
they are creating. But expecting states to do this even in the future, let alone 
to rewrite existing treaties, borders on the fantastical. There are simply no 
incentives for states to do that—they chose the current ambiguity for a rea-
son. Even if states were to agree on clear mandates at the outset, we would 
still have to consider whether certain courts have outgrown their original 
mandates and accrued more authority—patterns clearly visible in courts like 
the ECJ and ECHR.296 
But it seems equally difficult to impose a backward-looking doctrinal 
test. The most common approach to this problem is to focus on the question 
of delegation: how much authority have the state parties actually delegated 
to the particular tribunal in question? Are tribunals in a particular area 
agents or trustees?297 For a number of reasons, this approach seems unlikely 
to yield many clear answers. 
First, there are roughly two approaches one could take to assessing the 
level of delegation to and, in turn, the proper authority of particular courts, 
tribunals, or bodies. The first, a formal approach, would focus on actual lan-
guage of the treaties creating the tribunals. Exactly what powers has the 
treaty explicitly granted or failed to grant the particular body? The second, a 
more functional approach, would focus instead on the role the tribunal 
seems to play in the structure of a given regime. Does the function or pur-
                                                                                                                           
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), with Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 
11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). As mentioned above though, see supra notes 107, 170–171, 290–292 and 
accompanying text, these types of questions seem unlikely to be answered through traditional 
custom; states have little need for such rules in negotiating settlements. On the contrary, the 
standards developed by international criminal tribunals look much more like international 
common law, with tribunals citing one another rather than state practice in search of such 
rules. Recognizing these standards as international common law would change the analysis for 
U.S. courts. As common law gap fillers, the standards developed by prior international tribu-
nals should be seen as keyed very specifically to the mandate and circumstances of those 
courts. U.S. courts might find the reasoning of those tribunals and the standards they adopt 
persuasive and worth following, but they must be highly cognizant of the differences in con-
text, being very careful, for example, in translating rules from some international crimes to 
others and from criminal law to tort. A U.S. court applying the Alien Tort Statute might, for 
example, find Nuremberg-era decisions about corporate liability too tied to criminal liability 
and to the specific politics of that moment and opt for traditional federal common law princi-
ples about corporate liability for torts instead. 
 296. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 130, at 276–82. 
 297. See, e.g., Alter, supra note 14, at 38–39. 
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pose of a tribunal suggest that it was meant to play more of an independent 
role in developing the law? This might focus the scope of the delegation 
created by the vagueness or certainty of the rules they’ve been mandated to 
apply—vaguer rules coupled with authority to resolve disputes may simply 
require a level of common law lawmaking (early international criminal tri-
bunals might fit here). It may focus on the extent to which courts seem to be 
created to protect interests other than those of states, as might be the case 
with human rights and investment tribunals. 
Neither of these approaches seems likely to answer the question satis-
factorily. The main problem is that the two approaches often seem to 
suggest opposite outcomes, making any decision based on one or the other 
controversial. From a formal perspective, bodies like the HRC established 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Inter-
American Commission, labeled as expert bodies rather than courts and with 
less-than-clear mandates, might seem to have the weakest claim to delegated 
authority. It is nonetheless those bodies that have made the strongest func-
tional claims to interpret the law authoritatively and have acted the most like 
common law courts in developing a jurisprudence.298 Similarly, when the 
ICJ operates under its advisory jurisdiction, its opinions are specifically 
nonbinding, yet because of the broad nature of the questions posed (con-
trasted with the sometimes narrow disputes it faces in its contentious 
jurisdiction) and the apparent authority of the Court, it is those decisions 
that often have the most jurisprudential influence.299 Beyond that, both the 
formal and functional approaches are largely indeterminate. From a formal 
standpoint, how much authority does the WTO Dispute Settlement Under-
standing actually give the panels and Appellate Body to apply general 
international law? Article 3 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ex-
pressly commands recourse to “customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law.”300 The same provision, though, adds that “[the Dispute 
Settlement Body] cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations pro-
vided in the covered agreements.”301 Debate rages over exactly what these 
provisions allow or require.302 What effect should be given to decisions of 
the HRC established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
                                                                                                                           
 298. See, e.g., Binder, supra note 28, at 1203–06 (analyzing the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights). 
 299. See, e.g., Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28) (setting standards for reservations to 
multilateral treaties); Reparations for Injuries Suffered in Service of United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11) (setting standards regarding the personality of international 
organizations); see also Karin Oellers‐Frahm, Lawmaking Through Advisory Opinions?, 12 
German L.J. 1033, 1041–42 (2011) (discussing impact of decisions). 
 300. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 
3(2), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Compare Joost Pauwelyn, How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based 
on Non-World Trade Organization Law, 37 J. World Trade 997, 998 (2003), with Joel P. 
Trachtman, Book Review, Conflicts of Norms in International Law: How WTO Law Relates to 
Other Rules of International Law, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 855, 857–58 (2004). 
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Rights? Neither the Covenant nor the Optional Protocol (granting the HRC 
jurisdiction over individual communications) says.303 
But there is a second, broader problem with approaching the question of 
what authority courts, tribunals, and other bodies have as one of delegation. 
Delegated by whom and when? Various bodies may disagree over who their 
principals are—human rights bodies, for example, might suggest it is the 
people rather than states304—or when the relevant delegation occurred—
some bodies, like the ECJ, might claim an evolving mandate over time. 
2. Toward Dialogue 
So what is there left to do? How can we mediate between custom and 
common law in international law? Rather than try to draw clear lines around 
the authority of states and courts, lines both are likely to ignore, a better 
approach might be to develop interfaces between the two, ways for states 
and courts to communicate, and ways for custom and common law to re-
spond to each other. Fully developing such approaches is an enormous 
project and one beyond the scope of this Article, but some possibilities can 
be gleaned from current practice and are sketched out below. 
The key to developing interfaces between court and state, common law 
and custom, is recognizing the reality noted earlier, that in both domestic 
and international law, negotiated law and adjudicated law rarely exist in their 
purest form, hermetically sealed off from each other.305 Instead, negotiations 
often occur under litigation’s threatening shadow, negotiated settlements may 
be monitored by courts, and courts often encourage and direct negotiation 
between parties. Similarly, common law rules may include a variety of refer-
ence points to negotiated rules, whether incorporating business custom as a 
rule of decision or recognizing industry standards as a safe harbor. Interna-
tional legal regimes have also experimented with different ways to interface, 
some of which may suggest ways to mediate the claims of states and tribu-
nals to interpretative authority in the future. In the best cases, such interfaces 
might actually be able to mobilize the best attributes of both negotiated and 
adjudicated law laid out earlier in Part I.B. 
a. Encouraging Prior Settlement, Negotiation, or Conciliation 
One way to mediate between negotiated and adjudicated law is to build 
a preference for negotiated solutions into the adjudicative process. Either 
                                                                                                                           
 303. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 
5(4), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (stating merely that the Committee “will forward its 
views”). 
 304. U.N. HRC, General Comment No. 26(61), supra note 165, ¶ 5 (declaring that even 
if state parties attempt to withdraw, their populations will continue to have rights under the 
Convention); Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights [IACHR], Annual Report of the IACHR 
2006, ch. 4, ¶ 54, IACHR Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127 (Mar. 3, 2007) (“[I]t was not the intention 
of the Organization of American States to leave the Cuban people without protection. That 
Government’s exclusion from the regional system in no way means that it is no longer bound 
by its international human rights obligations.” (quoting IACHR, Annual Report of the IACHR 
2002, ch. 4, ¶ 7, IACHR Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117 (Mar. 7, 2003)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 305. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
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specific procedural rules or professional norms may direct litigants to first 
try some form of negotiation, conciliation, or mediation before fully em-
barking on adjudication. In some cases, the court itself may even supervise 
the process. Many courts in the United States, for example, have programs 
to encourage mediation,306 and scholars have noted that, for better or for 
worse, U.S. judges seem increasingly to favor and endorse out-of-court set-
tlement as a means of dispute resolution.307 The length, breadth, and expense 
of the discovery process in the United States may structurally favor settle-
ments as well. 
A preference for negotiated settlements is also common, and often ex-
plicitly required, in international regimes. The WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding requires complaining members to first seek “consultations” 
with offending members before gaining access to the adjudicative machin-
ery.308 The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
encourages recourse to its conciliation machinery in investment disputes, 
and the U.S. Model BIT includes a “standard exhortation to consult before 
arbitrating.”309 Even the PCIJ and ICJ have at times called on the parties 
before them to further negotiate.310 As the PCIJ has explained,  
the judicial settlement of international disputes, with a view to 
which the Court has been established, is simply an alternative to the 
direct and friendly settlement of such disputes between the Parties; 
as consequently it is for the Court to facilitate, so far as is compati-
ble with its Statute, such direct and friendly settlement.311 
Such preferences for negotiation reflect a view that adjudication should 
be extraordinary and that an adjudicated result may not capture or forward 
the goals of the parties as well as negotiation. These preferences mediate the 
negotiated-law/adjudicated-law divide by creating space for negotiated law 
to prevail in the first instance and by channeling a smaller percentage of 
cases to adjudication. 
                                                                                                                           
 306. Patrick E. Longan, Bureaucratic Justice Meets ADR: The Emerging Role for Magis-
trates As Mediators, 73 Neb. L. Rev. 712, 715 & n.9 (1994) (describing the alternative dispute 
resolution movement in the United States); see also Fiss, supra note 43, at 1073 (criticizing 
the alternative dispute resolution movement). 
 307. E.g., Fiss, supra note 43, at 1073. 
 308. DSU, supra note 300, art. 4. 
 309. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State 
Disputes—A Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 7, 12 (2005). 
 310. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice As Conflict Resolution: Proliferation, Frag-
mentation, and Decentralization of Dispute Settlement in International Trade, 27 U. Pa. J. 
Int’l Econ. L. 273, 354 (2006). 
 311. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No. 22, at 13 (Aug. 19); see also Passage Through Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1991 I.C.J. 12, 20 
(July 29) (quoting Free Zones, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 22 at 13); Frontier Dispute (Burk. 
Faso/Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 577–78 (Dec. 22) (noting a preference for the parties to negotiate 
their own solutions). 
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b. Draft Opinions 
Another way to mediate between negotiated law and adjudicated law 
would be through the issuance of draft opinions by courts. Courts, tribunals, 
and other bodies might circulate a draft to the parties and invite their com-
ments in at least some form. The D.C. Court of Appeals in the United States 
experimented with just such a technique in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 
where the court first issued a tentative opinion, seeking comments from the 
parties.312 Based on the submissions of the parties, the court then revised 
and issued its final opinion.313 The experiment inspired others to propose its 
wider use, particularly where courts of appeals seek to overrule district court 
opinions.314 U.S. state appellate courts in Arizona, California, and New 
Mexico have also experimented with draft or tentative opinions.315 
A variant of this approach would be to subject tribunal decisions to ac-
ceptance by the parties, either the specific parties to the dispute316 or, as in 
the pre-WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,317 all parties to the 
agreement, before giving them effect or making them binding. While from a 
cynical standpoint, such a technique may look like nothing more than a way 
for parties to avoid liability and to allow interest to trump law, such a stand-
point oversimplifies the dynamic set in motion by a draft opinion. For one 
thing, the rules about revising or rejecting a decision can of course be cali-
brated in a variety of different ways to give more or less voice to various 
parties. Even if parties do have the ability to reject opinions entirely though, 
the draft opinion could have considerable influence on customary practice 
going forward. Assuming it is only privately available, the draft opinion may 
signal to parties the direction a future tribunal might take and suggest the 
wisdom of changing one’s actions or, alternatively, more proactively renego-
tiating a custom or agreement. If publicly available, the draft opinion may 
have even broader effects on existing practice. The unadopted panel report 
in the original GATT Tuna-Dolphin case might be a good example.318 In that 
case, the panel’s views on whether states could regulate Process and Produc-
                                                                                                                           
 312. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979), superseded by 636 F.2d 
323 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 313. Id.; see also Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Su-
preme Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 681, 810 n.582 (1984) 
(noting Costle as an example of a court effectively engaging the parties in a dialogue). 
 314. Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 313, at 810 n.582.  
 315. See generally Thomas E. Hollenhorst, Tentative Opinions: An Analysis of Their 
Benefit in the Appellate Court of California, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1, 1–5 (1995) (describ-
ing the practice in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two; 
Second District of the Arizona Court of Appeal; and New Mexico Court of Appeal). 
 316. An example here might be how the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea deals 
with claims to the continental shelf beyond two hundred miles. U.N. Convention on the Law 
of the Sea art. 76(8), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. States submit claims to the Commis-
sion on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which then issues a recommendation on 
boundaries. Id. If the state submitting the claim accepts the recommendation, it becomes bind-
ing on all other parties to the Convention. Id. 
 317. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 21–
22 (2005) (describing the evolution of the consensus requirement). 
 318. Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (Sept. 
3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993). 
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tion Methods and the territorial reach of their authority to regulate “to pro-
tect human, animal or plant life or health” have exerted considerable 
influence on state practices since—the United States, for example, revised 
both its policy and its arguments,319 and reactions to the unadopted report 
undoubtedly influenced the WTO Appellate Body’s eventually binding 
decision in the similar Shrimp-Turtle case.320 This was all notwithstanding 
the fact that the questions answered by the Tuna-Dolphin panel are regularly 
described as remaining open.321 From a positive perspective, such draft deci-
sions might have the advantage of leaving space for state practice while 
simultaneously influencing its direction, essentially fostering a dialogue 
between adjudicated and negotiated law. 
c. Margins of Appreciation 
Another way that adjudicated law interacts with negotiated law in both 
the domestic and international systems is by incorporating a role for current 
custom into the rules courts apply. Examples in domestic systems are famil-
iar. In tort law, industry or professional standards may be used to determine 
best practices within a certain field.322 Although they may not serve as full 
defenses to liability, they may have a role in defining at least a minimum 
standard of caution.323 In medical malpractice cases in the United States, 
liability is determined with reference to the professional standards among 
physicians.324 And commercial law may incorporate industry custom and 
usage in a variety of ways, exemplified in the U.S. Uniform Commercial 
Code’s use of “usage of trade” in interpreting contracts.325 
                                                                                                                           
 319. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 9–29, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). 
 320. Id. ¶¶ 180–184. 
 321. Robert Galantucci, Compassionate Consumerism Within the GATT Regime: Can 
Belgium’s Ban on Seal Product Imports Be Justified Under Article XX?, 39 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 
281, 311 (2009). 
 322. Alex J. Grant, New Theories of Cigarette Liability: The Restatement (Third) of Torts 
and the Viability of a Design Defect Cause of Action, 3 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 343, 375 
(1994); Alex B. Long, Lawyers Intentionally Inflicting Emotional Distress, 42 Seton Hall L. 
Rev. 55, 67–68 (2012); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Ena-
blement of Cybercrime, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1553, 1587–88 (2005). 
 323. 3 J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation 
§ 27:85 (2d ed. 2011) (“While compliance with or deviation from industry standards may be 
some evidence of defectiveness, such evidence is not conclusive. However, if a manufacturer 
knows that a common practice in an industry presents substantial and unjustifiable risk to 
consumers, then compliance with the common practice is not an absolute bar to recovery.”); 
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 322, at 1588 (“Custom provides the floor, but not necessarily the 
ceiling, of reasonable care.”). 
 324. E.g., M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 247, 290 
(2003); Joseph H. King, The Common Knowledge Exception to the Expert Testimony Re-
quirement for Establishing the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice, 59 Ala. L. Rev. 51, 
51 (2007). 
 325. U.C.C. § 1-205 (2001). It should be noted, though, that the Uniform Commercial 
Code is more open to such custom than the common law rules it replaced. Id. § 1-205 cmts. 4–
5. 
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One way in which international regimes may seek to incorporate rules 
developed from custom is through the application of margins of apprecia-
tion.326 In contrast to its approach in the deportation and extradition context 
described above,327 the ECHR is usually quite sensitive to evolving state 
practice on open questions of law or interpretation. Where no European con-
sensus on an issue has emerged, the court has applied a margin of 
appreciation—essentially a form of deference—to government actions or 
decisions. The doctrine has been applied to the regulation of speech328 and 
political parties329 and the relationship between state and religion,330 among 
other issues. Where applied, the doctrine leaves room for custom to develop. 
Importantly though, the doctrine seems to act as a one-way ratchet; once a 
consensus has emerged, that rule will be adopted into ECHR jurisprudence 
and applied in future cases.331 Proposals have already been made to extend 
the ECHR’s approach to other areas of international law, including interna-
tional intellectual property law332 and investment law.333 
Related techniques might be seen as ways to collect practice before or 
in preparation for adjudicated decisions. Requirements to exhaust local 
resources before availing oneself of the jurisdiction of various international 
bodies, whether in human rights334 or investment law,335 might be seen as a 
way to allow state practice to develop or percolate before international 
adjudication adopts a specific rule. Even if adjudication ends up replacing 
negotiated law with an adjudicated rule, that rule may be responsive to, 
rather than ignorant of, customary practice. Essentially, these various 
techniques confirm the superiority and supremacy of adjudicated law while 
still granting some respect to negotiated solutions. 
                                                                                                                           
 326. “Under this doctrine, national governments are given a certain degree of discretion 
regarding the specific manner in which they implement European Convention rights. . . . When 
a state’s choices fall within a predictably amorphous range of acceptable alternatives, the 
ECHR will uphold the state’s actions as being within its so-called ‘margin of appreciation.’ ” 
Donoho, supra note 232, at 451–52. 
 327. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 328. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1976). 
 329. Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 35. 
 330. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, ¶ 70 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe. 
int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040. 
 331. E.g., Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1988). 
 332. E.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority: An (Inter)Nationalist 
Perspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 Colum. J.L. & Arts 355, 388 (2007); Laurence R. 
Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPs Agreement: The Case for a European 
Human Rights Analogy, 39 Harv. Int’l L.J. 357, 432 (1998). 
 333. E.g., William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public 
Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 283, 
333–44 (2010). 
 334. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 222, art. 35(1).  
 335. Anne van Aaken, Primary and Secondary Remedies in International Investment 
Law and National State Liability: A Functional and Comparative View, in International 
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law 721, 735–39 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 
2010). 
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d. Legislative Overrides 
In the Anglo-American system, legislation overrides common law rules. 
In international law, treaties usually operate the same way. But one could 
also create mechanisms to allow less formal state practice to override an 
opinion.336 The FTC set up under NAFTA arguably operates in this way, 
offering the state parties an opportunity, acting together, to override a tribu-
nal’s interpretation and replace it with their own. Members of the WTO have 
similar authority to override an opinion while meeting as the Dispute Set-
tlement Body. Such a decision, however, must be accepted by all WTO 
members, making such rules very hard to enact.337 Still another version of 
such an override might be found in the U.N. Security Council’s ability to 
delay proceedings before the International Criminal Court.338 Although this 
authority operates more at a procedural level than a substantive one—it 
changes no substantive rulings of the court—it could nonetheless be seen as 
a way in which adjudicative law is pushed aside while states attempt to re-
solve the dispute themselves. 
The impact such an override rule might have is particularly obvious in 
the case of self-defense and nonstate actors described above.339 A formal 
rule that state practice in the area, whether in the form of government state-
ments, military manuals, or justifications and reactions to attempted 
interventions, could override the few comments by the ICJ on the matter 
would dramatically tip the scales in favor of finding an international law rule 
accepting an “unwilling or unable” standard for taking action in the territory 
of another state. 
e. Contestation 
A final way to mediate the relationship between negotiated law and ad-
judicated law might be to encourage explicit contestation between states and 
courts over their relative authority to shape international law rules. This 
would differ from current jockeying described above in that it would not 
center on contested claims about the content of custom, but instead on who 
should be elaborating the rules in a particular system. It would allow human 
rights and investment tribunals to make claims to be guardians of third-party 
beneficiaries and states to assert claims of greater democratic legitimacy. 
This approach has at times been adopted by the HRC340 and is arguably at 
                                                                                                                           
 336. Of course, over time, state practice might be seen as developing a new rule, but the 
general assumption is that in overriding a prior rule, state practice will have to be reasonably 
clear and not just evidence of widespread violation.  
 337. E.g., Pauwelyn, supra note 302, at 998–99. 
 338. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 16, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 (“No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this 
Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that 
request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.”). 
 339. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 340. The Human Rights Committee has, for example, asserted its authority over that of 
states to determine the effectiveness of reservations. U.N. HRC, General Comment No. 24, 
supra note 165, ¶ 18. 
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the heart of the ECHR’s firm stand on assurances.341 It may also be implied 
in arbitral tribunals’ attempts to ensure “equality of arms” between investors 
and states.342 This approach relates back to the discussion of sources 
above343 in that it encourages crisper, clearer arguments about the stakes 
involved in battles between states and courts. 
Such a combative approach, of course, will be available to very few tri-
bunals—likely only those with sufficient independence from states344 and 
sufficient ability to appeal to audiences other than the states themselves (in-
vestors, human rights advocates, domestic populations, or national judges) 
to bolster their legitimacy and influence compliance. It is arguably this con-
fluence of factors that has allowed the ECHR to push back against state 
resistance on the question of assurances. But it is a confluence of factors 
that will likely be rare among international tribunals tasked with technical 
aspects of the law with little salience outside a small community. 
As noted, many of the techniques suggested above are already in use in 
various legal regimes. Future work could focus on why certain techniques 
have been adopted in some regimes rather than others and when and why 
they have proved effective. It might, for example, focus on why negotiated 
law might be favored in some contexts and accommodated through legisla-
tive overrides or draft opinions, and why adjudicated law might be favored 
in others, through margins of appreciation. It might consider when negotia-
tion ought to be encouraged and when courts should claim interpretative 
power for themselves. 
Here, the differences between the negotiated law and adjudicated law 
models laid out in Part I.B may serve as guideposts. For example, one of the 
distinctions that emerges from the literature on out-of-court settlements is 
between private law and public law values. Negotiated law, with its empha-
sis on the value of bargained-for outcomes and ongoing relationships,345 
may be more appropriate to situations that look more like contracts. Transla-
tion tools like legislative overrides or draft opinions that favor state practice 
over court interpretations may be most valuable in those contexts where the 
rules in question are the result of careful and explicit bargaining for recipro-
cal benefits between states, as is perhaps the case with trade or investment 
agreements. 
By contrast, adjudicated law’s attributes seem particularly important in 
areas of public law, where the rights and responsibilities of broad classes are 
at issue. In such cases—perhaps, for example, human rights law—the values 
of neutral judging and reason giving, of justice rather than peace, and of 
developing clear rules that set precedents for state action and individual 
                                                                                                                           
 341. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 342. E.g., Thomas W. Wälde, Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration Under 
the Shadow of the Dual Role of the State: Asymmetries and Tribunals’ Duty to Ensure, Pro-
actively, the Equality of Arms, 26 Arb. Int’l 3, 4–5 (2010). 
 343. See supra Part III.A. 
 344. Investment arbitral tribunals demonstrate the fragility of such independence. On the 
one hand, arbitrators are not beholden to states and could decide each case as they deem just 
with little concern of punishment. On the other hand, as repeat players seeking future ap-
pointments, arbitrators may not be willing to challenge states too directly. 
 345. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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rights in the future seem particularly important.346 (A key argument in the 
debate over out-of-court settlements is that settlements don’t develop rules 
that can benefit all.347) It may be in just such cases that judges’ claims to 
control legal developments, either through margins of appreciation or 
through more aggressive contestation, are most appropriate. It should not be 
surprising that as areas like trade and investment start to touch on public law 
questions like the environment, calls for these judge-centric tools in-
crease.348 
Alternatively, choosing the right translation tools may turn on the 
perceived value of accumulated experience in informing final outcomes and 
rules. Draft opinions, for example, may marry some of the best features of 
negotiated and adjudicated law. On the one hand, adjudicating a question 
allows for a quicker, clearer articulation of the key arguments and a 
proposed rule; on the other, if unadopted, the proposed rule is stripped of 
some of its precedential value, allowing it to be tested more slowly by 
experience and to play out over time. Margins of appreciation similarly 
allow courts to collect state practice and use it as an input, informing their 
decision making through experience. Margins build authority for courts’ 
judgments by anchoring them more directly in state practice while 
simultaneously swaying state practice in the direction of the courts’ preferred 
rules.349 Choosing between the more state-controlled option of draft opinions 
and the more court-controlled option of margins of appreciation (as well as 
calibrating those options themselves) may turn on the relative perceived 
importance for an area of law of the experience states can bring to the table 
and the fundamental values that courts should articulate and protect. 
Neither of the two steps described above—neither clarifying the sources 
of nontreaty law nor mediating between judicial and state control of doc-
trine—will definitively resolve the types of conflicts over particular rules 
laid out in Part II.B. Instead, they reveal the stakes of the arguments by clar-
ifying sources of authority and claims of legitimacy while suggesting 
techniques that can channel these disputes into constructive dialogue. They 
demonstrate that these disputes are not the result of international law’s radi-
cal indeterminacy, as some critics might suggest, but principled 
disagreements over the nature of international law in certain areas. These 
steps can also hopefully allow international doctrine to develop more organ-
ically, as courts and other interpretative bodies are liberated from the 
warping box of “custom” to better articulate the sources of the rules they 
apply. 
Conclusion 
“The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the ar-
ticulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified,” 
                                                                                                                           
 346. See supra Part I.B.5. 
 347. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 348. See, e.g., Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 333, at 283. See generally Schill, 
supra note 26. 
 349. See, e.g., Donoho, supra note 232, at 450–66. 
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Justice Holmes famously proclaimed.350 It is time for international law’s 
purported sovereigns and quasi sovereigns to stand up and articulate their 
claims to legal authority. Only when we recognize the very different sources 
of law in play in international law, and the very different rationales behind 
them, will we be able to fully grapple with the relationship between court 
and state and the roles each will play in a world of expanding, increasingly 
complex international regulation. 
                                                                                                                           
 350. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes’s 
dissent presaged the majority opinion in Erie. 
